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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the liquidity impact of
NASDAQ security cross-listings on the American Stock Exchange (Amex). Using a
comprehensive sample of cross-listing equities, transactions data obtained from the
NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, and market data obtained from the Center for
Research in Securities Pricing (CRSP) database, I find positive abnormal returns on days
when positive news is released regarding security cross-listings. This indicates that crosslisting creates value for cross-listing firms. I also document significant decreases in
trading costs of the cross-listed securities around the cross-listing date. In general, market
participants perceive exchange competition to create value, and in the case of Amex
cross-listing the NASDAQ 100, trading costs decrease significantly around the crosslisting date.
The second essay examines adverse selection costs in basket securities. I compare the
adverse selection costs of exchange traded funds against a matched sample of equities. I
document lower quoted and effective spreads and higher quoted depth in exchange traded
funds relative to a matched sample of equities. I also examine how industry and security
concentration in basket securities influences trading and adverse selection costs. I find
increased quoted and effective spreads and lower depth in industry concentrated and
international basket securities. The results of this essay have a direct impact on the
trading decisions of individual and institutional investors, and on fund management firms
that sponsor the creation of exchange traded fund products.

iii

The third essay examines the impact of the introduction of nine Sector Standard and Poor
Depository Receipts on the underlying securities.

I employ a Seemingly Unrelated

Regression model to measure the changes in liquidity of the underlying equities around
the introduction of the Sector Standard and Poor Depository Receipts. I examine the
changes in adverse selection costs in the underlying securities around the introduction of
the concentrated basket securities. The third essay is the first examination of the liquidity
impact of Sector specific exchange traded fund on the underlying equities

iv
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Part 1:

Dissertation Introduction

1

The seminal work of Akerlof (1970) provides insight into the world of imperfect
information. Akerlof demonstrates the possibility of market failure when agents interact
in markets where information sets differ across participants. Market makers and
specialists are exposed to the asymmetrical information problem outlined in Akerlof
(1970), because they trade with informed agents in an environment of anonymity.

For example, Kyle (1985) suggests market markers increase the bid-ask spread when
trading with informed agents, where it is generally accepted that the bid-ask spread
consists of three costs. These include the inventory holding, order-processing, and
adverse selection components. The inventory holding component of the bid-ask spread
compensates the market maker for holding securities in amounts above or below the
desired equilibrium level. The order-processing component compensates the market
maker for costs associated with transacting orders such as labor and clearing costs. The
third component is the adverse selection component, which compensates market makers
for the level of informed trading in the security. This dissertation examines adverse
selection costs in several contexts and this analysis provides the depth of this work. I
discuss each essay below.

Market markers are exposed to two types of informed trading in the securities market.
First, they are exposed to trading on firm specific information and second, they are
exposed to trading by market participants who possess knowledge regarding impending
order flow. If an informed agent trades on either type of information, the market maker is
forced to match the order at an inferior price. The prevailing price is inferior because it
2

does not reflect the information that is known by the informed agent and unknown to the
market maker.

The small costs associated with the bid-ask spread are significant when considered on a
macro scale. Take IBM for example, which is currently trading around $80, and
currently1 has an average daily trading volume of around 7,000,000 shares. A one tenth
of a percent increase (.1%) in the bid-ask spread results in an eight cents increase in
spread. This increase may seem trivial at the per trade level, but when considered in the
context of the total volume, the true costs come into perspective. An eight-cent increase
in the bid-ask spread increases trading costs by $560,000 for each trading day, and for an
average year containing 252 trading days, the total increase in trading costs is
$141,120,000.

This dissertation examines adverse selection costs, depth, and bid-ask spreads in several
contexts. The first essay addresses the liquidity and trading quality changes of 120
NASDAQ equities that began cross trading on the AMEX under Unlisted Trading
Privileges. I employ a Seemingly Unrelated Regression to examine the liquidity and
trading quality impact of AMEX entry. This essay is the first examination of AMEX
entry into trading NASDAQ equities. The results of this essay have implications for
regulatory policy towards cross trading, and will influence future decisions regarding
cross-trading venue choices.

1

According to Yahoo-finance.com the average daily volume on July 30, 2003 was 7,288,1136 shares.
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The second essay examines adverse selection costs and liquidity of exchange trades funds
(ETFs) relative to a matched sample of equity securities. I also examine how basket
security concentration influences costs associated with informed trading. The second
essay contributes to the microstructure literature in several ways.

This is the first

examination of adverse selection costs in exchange traded funds, and it is the first
comparison of depth and spreads between exchange traded funds and a matched portfolio
of equities. It is also the first examination of the factors that contribute to adverse
selection costs in exchange traded funds. For example, the results of this essay have the
potential to directly impact the trading decisions of individual and institutional investors,
and have implications for investment management firms that sponsor the creation of
exchange traded fund products.

The third essay examines the impact of the introduction of nine Sector Standard and Poor
Depository Receipts (Sector SPDRs) on the underlying securities. I employ a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression model to measure the changes in liquidity of the underlying
equities around the introduction of the Sector Standard and Poor Depository Receipts. I
examine the extent to which uninformed traders migrate from trading in the underlying
securities to the basket securities. This is the first examination of the liquidity impact of
Sector specific exchange traded fund on the underlying equities. This essay also
examines the migration of informed trader between security types and should aid in
future exchange traded fund design.

4

Part 2:

Unlisted Trading Privileges and Market Quality

5

I. Introduction:
Equity markets are comprised of a multitude of exchanges and trading venues that have
become increasingly competitive over the past two decades. This increased competition
has been promoted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and has come at
the demand of the investing public. In the neo-classical sense, exchange competition is a
beneficial force that tends to reduce the monopoly profits of individual exchanges. In
support of traditional arguments, research suggests that trading costs decrease with the
entrance of market competitors (Cohen and Conroy (1990), and Van Ness, Van Ness, and
Hsieh (1999).

However, other studies have suggested that market efficiency may

decrease with the entrance of an exchange competitor. Amihud and Mendelson (1996)
explain why market competition is a double-edged sword: “the effect of multimarket
trading . . . is ambiguous because of the conflicting effects of competition and
fragmentation. On one hand, multimarket trading may generate liquidity improvements
due to enhanced intermarket competition. On the other hand, it may hurt liquidity
because it induces fragmentation of the order flow between markets”. Thus, the argument
for exchange competition is not one-sided; rather it must be considered in light of the
benefits induced by competition and the costs associated with order flow fragmentation.

Two determinants of multi-exchange trading efficiency are the linkages among and the
transparency across exchanges. These determinants have profound effects on the
efficiency of the “market” in which the security trades. Weak links between exchanges
result in a decreased probability of order flow interaction between markets, which
hampers price discovery. The transparency between exchanges is also an important factor
6

determining the efficiency of a multi-exchange trading environment. Profit opportunities
may arise when orders on one exchange are not posted to another.

Order flow fragmentation has become an issue of increasing regulatory interest since the
elimination of NYSE Rule 3902 and the establishment of the national market system. On
March 21, 2000, Arthur Levitt described3 transparency across and the linkages among
market centers as the “pillars” of the national market system. Linkages among market
centers play an important role in security market efficiency. Weak intermarket linkages
lead to order flow fragmentation, which often result in increased trading costs, and which
in turn increase the cost of equity capital (Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud,
Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997)). Order flow fragmentation occurs when orders in one
market do not interact with orders in a competing market (Stoll 2001). Thus, markets that
are poorly integrated, or fragmented, may experience increased difficulty in executing
orders (Lee 1993).

The linkages among and the transparency across markets were issues of concern in the
recent cross-listing of NASDAQ listed securities on the American Stock Exchange. On
August 12, 2002, the American Stock Exchange (Amex) began trading nine NASDAQ
Stock Market (NASDAQ) listed securities under unlisted trading privileges (UTP). By
November 21, 2002 a total of 120 NASDAQ listed equities were available to be crosstraded on the Amex under unlisted trading privileges (UTP). UTP allow shares to be

2

Prohibited NYSE member firms and affiliated persons from trading NYSE-listed stocks off the exchange.
Taken from in a speech given in Washington DC on March 10, 2000, entitled "Visible Prices, Accessible
Markets, Order Interaction".

3
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cross-listed on exchanges other than the primary exchange and these privileges are
granted under the Securities Act of 1933.
These cross listings provide the unique opportunity to study the impact of cross-trading
and order flow fragmentation on price discovery and trading costs. The results of this
investigation suggest that the investing public perceives cross-listing to be a net positive
benefit to traders of the cross-listing equities. I find positive abnormal returns on days
when positive news is released regarding Amex UTP cross-listing. Non-parametric sign
tests also indicate positive and significant changes in equity returns on these days.

I also examine the liquidity of the securities around their cross-listing dates and find that
bid-ask spreads decrease significantly while depth does not change. While controlling for
changes in trading volume, price, and return standard deviation, quoted spreads decrease
by 17.9% (t-statistic 3.25) on average. Dollar depth experiences an insignificant average
decrease of .3% (t-statistic -.10). The increase in liquidity is in contrast to that of a
matched sample of equities in which liquidity does not change.

The remainder of the work proceeds as follows. In section Ia., a brief discussion of the
national market system is provided. Section II discusses the history of the Amex’s pursuit
of unlisted trading privileges. Section III reviews the literature related to order-splitting
and market fragmentation. Section IV contains the hypothesis development, and section
V, discusses the research methodology. In sections VI and VII I present the results of the
analysis. In section VIII I discuss the implication of the empirical results, and in the final
section, IX, I present the conclusions of the study.

8

Ib. Market Competition:
In 1975, Congress passed an amendment4 to the Securities and Exchange act of 1934,
section 11A, which paved the way for the National Market System (NMS). The NMS
was established to accomplish the following goals: i) provide economically efficient
executions; (ii) promote fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange
markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets; (iii)
make quotation and transaction information publicly available; (iv) provide investors
with the opportunity to obtain best execution; and (v) offer the opportunity to obtain trade
execution without dealer participation, to the extent consistent with economically
efficient executions and opportunity to obtain best execution.5 One of the significant
outcomes of the establishment of the NMS was the elimination of the off-board trading
rules, such as Rule 390 of the NYSE. Rule 390 prohibited NYSE members from
transacting in NYSE-listed securities off the NYSE. The elimination of these restrictions
paved the way for the development of a system of linked markets and was the impetus for
the increase in exchange competition. These regulatory changes have led to the rise of
Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and increased competition among existing
exchanges.

II. The American Stock Exchange and Unlisted Trading Privileges:
On December 17, 2001, the Amex filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities act of 1934, to trade
4
5

For an excellent review of the US market regulatory environment see Beny (2001).
15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1).
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NASDAQ securities under unlisted trading privileges. The Amex planned to trade all
stocks that were included in the NASDAQ 100 index and all NASDAQ listed equities
included in the SandP 500 index.

Prior to the SEC’s approval of the Amex filing on August 2, 2002, several groups cited
concerns regarding the entry of the Amex into UTP trading of NASDAQ securities. The
SEC received two letters addressing the issue of delayed execution. The first letter was
submitted by Knight Trading Group, who expressed concern over Amex entry for two
reasons6. First, Knight suggested the possible disruption of the national market system,
and further contended that Amex trading would undermine the firm quote rule.

Under

the proposed rules, Amex traders would be allowed to trade national market securities
without providing automatic execution. Knight argued that this would give Amex traders
the ability to gain an informational advantage by monitoring trading and quoting
activities of national market securities without the obligation of automatic execution.
Orders sent to the Amex by NASDAQ market makers were to be provided no guarantee
of automatic execution.

The SEC received a second comment letter from a congressional panel on May 20, 2002.7
The congressional panel expressed similar concerns regarding the ability of Amex
members to delay execution. They further contended that this ability would increase the
incidence of “locked” and crossed markets. The panel suggested that the market with the
6

See SEC Release Number 34-46305 (August, 2 2002) and SEC letter from Michael T. Dorsey, Senior
Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Knight, to Commission (February 28, 2002).
7
See SEC letter from Congresswoman Judy Biggert, Congressmen Mike Ferguson, Walter B. Jones, Mike
Rogers, Ed Royce, and Patrick Tiberi to The Honorable Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Commission (May 29,
2002).
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least sophisticated technology would gain an advantage, because of the ability to monitor
market activity without the requirement of automatic execution.

In addition to the concerns of the ability of Amex members to delay execution, the
interaction between order flow on the Amex and order flow on the NASDAQ was an
issue of concern. The Amex does not trade NASDAQ securities via the inter-market
trading system (ITS), and there is no “official” inter-market linkage system for NASDAQ
securities. Furthermore, the Amex does not participate in the NASDAQ’s SuperMontage.

Despite the issues raised in the two comment letters, the Amex was granted the proposed
rule change on August 2, 2002. On August 12, 2002 the Amex began trading nine
NASDAQ listed stocks under unlisted trading privileges, with the intention of adding an
additional 111 securities. The only halt of Amex UTP trading came on the close of
trading, August 14, 2002, when the Amex was informed of a filing with the SEC. This
filing had the effect of automatically staying the SEC’s previous approval of UTP trading
on the Amex8.

The filing was submitted by Knight Trading Inc. in response to the method in which
Amex’s UTP trading would interact with other markets9. Since Knight Trading’s filing
was not directed at the SEC’s approval of the Amex’s UTP trading, the SEC issued an
order denying the petition for review. This allowed the Amex to resume trading on
August 27, 2002. The roll out process continued, including twelve groupings, with the
8

See letter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Commission, from John J.D. McFerrin-Clancy, Schlam Stone
and Dolan, dated August 15, 2002.
9
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 46409.
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last group of 10 securities being added on November 21, 2002. Table 2.a contains the roll
out schedule for the 12010 equities.
(Table 2.a here)

The absence of an integrated trading system may lead to market fragmentation, such that
traders in one market cannot directly observe the order flow in orthogonal markets11.
Delays in reporting and slow interaction between market centers increase the probability
of fragmentation, which creates the opportunity for traders to split strategically their
orders between markets. Weak market interaction combined with the perceived threat of
the Amex member’s ability to delay execution could result in poor market quality. As a
result of delayed order execution and the absence of an integrated trading system, market
participants could respond with larger bid-ask spreads and decreased depth. Both larger
bid-ask spreads and decreased depth represent an increased cost of trading, and in turn, a
higher cost of equity.

III. Order Splitting and Market Fragmentation:
The literature on order splitting has provided great insight into multi-market trading
activity. Chowdry and Nanda (1991) develop a theoretical model where traders can
choose to trade between markets. The model indicates that in the presence of small
liquidity traders, informed agents will optimally transact in the market where small
liquidity traders trade. The theoretical model of Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) suggests
10

During the initial roll out process, the securities that comprise the NASDAQ 100 changed. The securities
that were added to the NASDAQ 100, and subsequently traded on the Amex, are not included in this study.
11
See Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) for a discussion of order flow fragmentation between NYSE and
Amex cross listings of Exchange Traded Funds.
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that trading costs can increase when traders are able to split their orders between markets.
They show that in a multi-market trading environment, market makers set less
competitive price schedules and earn strictly positive profits. Menkveld (2003) provides
empirical support for the theoretical models of Chowdry and Nanda (1991) and Bernhardt
and Hughson (1997). Menkveld examines the market for Dutch stocks that trade in both
Amsterdam and New York, and finds that traders split their orders between markets
during the hours in which both markets are open. Additionally, he finds that traders who
strategically split their orders are privately informed traders.

The literature on fragmentation has provided mixed results. According to Lee (1993), a
fully integrated market is one in which all price-relevant information is available at each
location and is communicated quickly to the entire market. Stoll (2001) suggests several
factors that could make competition from satellite markets more effective. First, quote
and transaction price transparency should make it possible for a satellite market to
credibly guarantee that the price in the primary market is being matched. Second,
satellite markets should pay for order flow in addition to matching prices. Third,
technological changes should make the satellite markets better competitors. Fong,
Madhavan, and Swan (2001) study the determinants of off-market trading using data
from the Australian stock market, and find that off-market trading is positively related to
trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and index inclusion. However, they find off-market
trading to be negatively related to market depth and option listing.

13

Several works have documented the benefit of market consolidation. Models of trading
activity (e.g. Pagano 1989a and 1989b) suggest that consolidation of order flow benefits
traders and results in positive externalities. Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin, and Netter (1999)
examine consolidation of the regional exchanges and find that consolidation attracts
market share and leads to lower bid-ask spreads. Several studies document the costs
associated with fragmented non-centralized trading. Madhavan (1995) shows that
fragmented markets are price inefficient and should exhibit higher levels of price
volatility than do consolidated markets. Lee (1993) examines the cost of execution across
the NASDAQ, NYSE, and several regional exchanges, and finds that the execution price
of similar trades can differ significantly based on location of execution Easley, Kiefer,
and O’Hara (1996) examine “cream-skimming” that occurs between orders on the
Cincinnati and NYSE exchanges. They find that diversion of orders between markets is
not “benign” and document differences in information across exchanges.

However, several works document the benefits of non-centralized trading. Battalio (1997)
examines the bid-ask spread before and after a third market dealer (Madoff) enters the
market. The study documents a decrease in the bid-ask spread, and finds that trading
costs do not increase after entry. Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2001), using data from the
Australian stock market, find that alternative trading exhibits lower price impact for
block trades than the consolidated electronic limit order book. They conclude that the
existence of an alternative-trading venue (upstairs market) leads to a Pareto improvement
because no set of market participants was harmed at the expense of others, while total
market quality improved. Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) examine the market quality for
14

ETFs that cross-listed on the NYSE from the Amex under unlisted trading privileges.
They document double-digit percentage declines in quoted, effective, and realized
spreads. They also find that quoted depth increases across all market centers after the
NYSE begins UTP trading of ETFs. DeFontnouvelle et al. (2000) examine option crosslistings and find effective spreads and quoted bid-ask spreads decrease after multi-listing.

IV. Hypotheses Development:
The inability of order flow to interact contemporaneously across parallel markets causes
order flow fragmentation. Because transactions do not occur in one central market, the
order flow that occurs at time t in a primary market may not interact with order flow that
occurs in a competing market at time t. Order flow fragmentation does not exist in a
single market trading environment. Thus, the central question is which trading framework
is better, a centralized market or market of competing exchanges.

One argument often made by centralized trading proponents is that market liquidity is
enhanced in a single exchange market. Centralized trading, it is argued, increases the
probability of order interaction, thereby improving trading costs (i.e. lowering bid-ask
spreads and enhancing market depth). It is also argued that the price impact of a trade is
lower in a single exchange market (Amihud and Mendelson (1996)). On the other hand,
if trading takes place across markets, there is a reduced probability of order interaction.
Order interaction increases with market transparency and with the improvement of
market linkages.

15

Proponents of centralized trading also argue that it improves price discovery. They
suggest that satellite markets free-ride from the information production of the primary
market. The primary market is not afforded compensation and this process results in a
decreased propensity by the primary market to offer the service.

This problem is

magnified with poor information linkages across markets. Amihud and Mendelson (1996)
argue:
“multimarket trading…may reduce liquidity because it can cause fragmentation
when a security's order flow is split among a number of markets that are not
perfectly coordinated…the number of bids and offers to buy and sell the security
in each market declines, as does the aggregate trading volume, relative to a
regime under which the entire order flow is consolidated in one market…an order
of a given size sent to a market for execution will find fewer limit orders or quotes
available on the other side at any given price. Both the price impact of the order
and the bid-ask spread it faces in each market will tend to be higher than if trading
were confined to a single market.”(pp. 1434)
The structure of UTP trading on the Amex has increased the probability of order
fragmentation in UTP securities because of the separation of interaction between trading
that occurs on the Amex and trades that occur in other markets. Since the Amex does not
participate in the NASDAQ SuperMontage, and the linkage between the AMEX and
NASDAQ is considered weak, one could expect a significant impact on the liquidity of
cross-listing securities. This leads to the first hypothesis tested in this work:

Hypothesis I
The Amex entry into cross-trading NASDAQ securities has lead to no change in market
quality or trading costs. Alternatively, the entry of the Amex may have decreased or
increased the trading costs.

16

The second hypothesis tested in this work is related to adverse selection. Securities
dealers are exposed to the asymmetrical information problem outlined by Akerlof (1970)
because they trade with informed agents in an environment of anonymity. Kyle (1985)
suggests that market markers increase their bid-ask spreads when trading with informed
agents, where the bid-ask spread is defined as the difference between the prevailing ask
and bid price at any time t.

It is generally accepted that the bid-ask spread consists of three cost components:
inventory holding costs, order-processing costs, and adverse selection costs. The
inventory holding component of the bid-ask spread compensates the market maker for
holding securities in amounts above or below the desired equilibrium level. The orderprocessing component allows the market maker to cover the costs associated with
completing orders. The third component is the adverse selection component, which
compensates market makers for the level of informed trading in the security.
Furthermore, market markers are exposed to two types of informed trading in the
securities market.

First, they are exposed to trading on firm-specific information.

Second, they are exposed to trading by market participants who possess knowledge
regarding impending order flow. If an informed agent trades on either type of
information, the market marker is forced to match the order at a price that does not reflect
the information that is known by the informed agent.

17

Weak market interaction combined with the perceived threat of Amex members’ abilities
to delay execution could lead to increases in the adverse selection component of the bidask spread. This leads to the second hypothesis that is tested in this work:

Hypothesis II
The entry of the Amex into cross-trading NASDAQ securities has lead to no increase in
the costs associated with informed trading, as defined by the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread. Alternatively, the entry of the Amex may have
decreased or increased the costs associated with informed trading.

V. Methodology:
Va. Data:
All transactions data are collected from The New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote
(TAQ) database, and are filtered using methods similar to those used in and Lipson and
Mortal (2003). I exclude the following data points:
•

Non-positive prices and quotes

•

All quotes with a time stamp before 9:30am or after 4:00pm

•

Quotes with zero sized bid or offer depths

•

Trading prices and midpoint greater than 50% over their previous level

Buys and sells are classified using the methodology of Lee and Ready (1990). I excluded
Bond ETF spreads because they are unlikely to exhibit characteristics that are indicative
of those of equity funds. Security price, volume and daily price data are collected from
The Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. Quote and trade data are
18

collected for each firm for 30 days prior to (“pre-period”) trading and 30 days after the
beginning of trading (“post-period”) of the firm’s equity on the Amex.

Vb. Event Study:
The market reaction to the announcement of Amex entry into UTP trading of NASDAQlisted securities is evaluated. Abnormal returns associated with the announcement of UTP
trading are compared across announcement types12. If positive abnormal returns are
associated with favorable SEC announcements, this would provide evidence that market
participants expect a positive net benefit13 to accrue to the owners of the equities.
Positive benefits could be derived from decreased trading costs (i.e. decreased spreads
and increased liquidity), which arise because of increased competition. However, if
negative abnormal returns are found, this may suggest that market participants expect
increased trading costs from the entrance of the new competitor.

The event dates used in this study can be found in Table 2.b. These dates include: the
initial filing date, the date when the filing appeared in the Federal Register, the date when
the SEC granted the UTP request, the date when the SEC suspended UTP trading
privileges, and the date when the SEC rescinded the suspension.

12

For instance, the initial SEC announcement that granted the Amex UTP privileges would be considered a
public announcement in favor of the Amex gaining UTP privileges, while the SEC suspension of the Amex
UTP trading privileges would be considered a public announcement against the Amex continuing its UTP
trading activities.
13
If the entry of the Amex represents a decrease in trading costs, the required rate of return on the security
would decrease and the current value of the security would increase (Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and
Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997)). If Amex entry results in larger bid-ask spreads and/or lower
levels of liquidity, the required rate of return on the securities would increase and the current value of the
security should decrease.
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The standard market model is used to derive one-day (0) abnormal returns. Abnormal
returns are calculated as: ARit = Rit − αˆi − βˆi Rmt , where Rit is the return to firm i on day t,

αˆ i is an intercept term estimated using the prior 250 trading days returns, βˆi is the
market beta for the ith firm estimated using the prior 250 trading days returns, and Rmt is
the market return on day t. A non-parametric sign rank test is also performed on the oneday abnormal returns. The sign test indicates the proportion of firms in the sample that
have positive returns on each event day, and is free of the distributional assumptions
made by parametric tests.

(Table 2.b here)

Table 2.b includes the results of the event study analysis. On the day that the American
Stock exchange filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for Unlisted Trading
Privileges there were no discernable abnormal returns. Furthermore, 52% of the firms had
positive abnormal returns with a sign rank t statistic14 of .40. When the American Stock
Exchange was granted unlisted trading privileges, on August 2, 2002, the one-day
abnormal returns of the sample NASDAQ firms was .03% (t statistic = .734). On this
date, 76.1% (t statistic = 5.22) of the firms had positive returns.

14

The sign rank t statistic is calculated using the following formula:

tsign = ( P − .5)

. Where p is
.25
N
percentage of firms with positive abnormal returns, and N is the number of firms in the sample.
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The market reaction to the announcement of the suspension is associated with a decrease
in the abnormal returns of the NASDAQ sample, but the decrease is not significant at
traditional significance levels.

The significance of the abnormal returns on the days when the Securities and Exchange
Commission suspended the unlisted trading privileges of the Amex is difficult to
interpret. At first it would seem that this event should be associated with significant
negative abnormal returns, but the suspension of Amex UTP trading was the result of a
filing by Knight Trading. Given Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, the
suspension was automatic. Actually, the Securities and Exchange Commission found
Knight Trading’s petition to lack merit, and, in effect, its filing was not a credible threat
to Amex UTP trading of NASDAQ equities

In general, the results indicate that the investing public perceives the Amex’s entry into
trading NASDAQ securities as a net positive benefit. In conjunction with the test of
market perception of Amex entry, an analysis of the bid-ask spread and liquidity changes
must also be presented. The analysis of the cost of trading is discussed in the next section.

Vc. Trading Costs:
Two spread estimates are employed in this analysis, and are similar to those used in
Boehmer and Boehmer (2003). The first measurement, the quoted spread, is calculated as
QSt = Askt − Bidt , where Askt is the ask price at time t and Bidt is the bid at time t. This
measure of the spread does not consider trades that take place inside the best bid-best
offer quote. Lee (1993), Huang and Stoll (1996) suggest the use of the effective spread,
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which is calculated as ES = 2 pt − MPt , where pt is the price at time t, and MPt is the
quote midpoint at time t. This estimate is often used to proxy for the total price impact of
trades. These measures of the spread are paired with additional control variables to
examine pre and post UTP trading costs using an OLS framework. The specification is
discussed below.

Vd. Liquidity Analysis:
The entry of the Amex into the trading of NASDAQ stocks represents increased
competition to NASDAQ dealers. Dealers may respond to increased competition by
lowering quoted depth15. Empirical research suggests that quoted bid-ask spreads tend to
increase in price and volatility. However, spreads tend to decrease as trading volume
increases (Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972), Benston and Hagerman (1974), and Hamilton
(1978)). To examine any change in liquidity, I employ a multivariate analysis of spreads
and depth, while controlling for price level, return volatility, and trading volume changes.
Because of possible negative correlation between the error terms in the specifications of
spreads and depth, I estimate a Seemingly Unrelated Regression16 of the following form:
LogSpreadRatio j = α S 0 + β S 1 LogVolumeRatio j + β S 2 LogPriceRatio j + β S 3 LogStdDevRatio j + ε Sj
LogDepthRatio j = α D 0 + β D1LogVolumeRatio j + β D 2 LogPriceRatio j + β D 3 LogStdDevRatio j + ε Dj
where E [ε Sj ε Dj ] ≠ 0

15

Chou and Lee (2003) find that for three NYSE decimalization pilot stocks, both spreads and quotes
decreased after tick size restrictions were removed. Their results suggest that the decreased profit from
smaller spreads was met with a decrease in depth.
16
This model is similar to the one employed in Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998).
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LogSpreadRatioj is calculated two ways. First, it is the natural log of the ratio17 of the
average quoted spread in the post-period to the average quoted spread in the pre-period.
Second, it is the natural log of the average effective spread in the post-period to the
average quoted spread in the pre-period. This measure is calculated for each of the j
firms. LogDepthRatioj is the natural log of the ratio of the post-period dollar depth to the
pre-period dollar depth. The independent variables LogPriceRatioj, LogStdDevRatioj, and
LogVolumeRatioj represent the ratio of the average post period to pre price, return
standard deviation, and daily volume for firm j, respectively. The pre-period is defined as
the thirty days preceding the cross-listing of firm j on the Amex, and the post-period is
the thirty days following the cross-listing of the firm j on the Amex. The model is
constructed such that the intercepts capture the change in the dependent variable around
cross-listing date t for firm j.

Ve. Control Sample:
To provide an estimate of changes in market liquidity during the sample period, I
compare the trading costs of the cross-listed securities to those in a control sample. To
create the control sample, I match equities based on price, shares outstanding, and trading
volume. The process of selection includes the following steps. For each Amex UTP
cross-listed share, I identify all non-cross-listed shares on the NASDAQ, Amex, and
NYSE. Each equity from this set is then matched with one equity from the cross-listing

17

The sample consists of 30 days before and 30 days after the entry of the Amex for each group of
NASDAQ equities. The quoted spread represents the difference between the ask price and the bid price.
The effective spread, 2|Pt-Mt|, is twice the absolute difference between the price and the quoted mid-point.
Dollar depth is the sum of the depth at the bid and ask prices, and represents the number of shares
multiplied times the prevailing price.
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set using trading volume, price, and return standard deviation. Average daily volume18,
stock price, and shares outstanding are averaged over 60 days, centered on the day of
cross-listing for both matching and cross-listing firms.

This matching method is similar to the one employed by Clarke and Shastri (2001).
Matching firms must have traded for more than one year and not undergone a suspension
of trading during the sixty-day window immediately preceding the cross-listing. Firms
that minimize the following expression are selected at the matching equities:


non-UTP

− PriceiUTP
Matching Score=  Pricei
non-UTP
+PriceiUTP
 Pricei

2

2

 
  Std non-UTP − Std UTP
i
i
 +
non-UTP
+Std iUTP
  Std i
 
2

2

 
  Volume non-UTP − Volume UTP
i
i
 +
non-UTP
+VolumeiUTP
  Volumei
 
2







2

The matched portfolio acts as a benchmark for drawing conclusions regarding spread and
depth changes. The values obtained from the matching process are presented in table2.c.

(Table 2.c here)

The average price of the 120 UTP cross-listing NASDAQ securities is $20.86 and the
average price of the matching securities is $21.04. The mean standard deviation of the
cross-listing firms is 4.91% and the average daily return standard deviation for the
matched sample is 4.97%. The average adjusted volume for the cross-listing firms was
18

Volume in dealer markets is overstated because of inter-dealer trading (see Anderson and Dyl (2003)).
NASDAQ volume is adjusted to sixty percent of its original amount to facilitate matching across
exchanges.
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5,237,199 shares and the average volume of the matched sample was 4,835,896. The
matching criterion are not significantly different between the cross-listing firms and the
matched sample. The insignificant differences in the matching criteria, in additional to
the low average matching score of .0723, indicates that the firms included in the two
samples are similar along the pre-specified attributes. This matching score is low relative
to other studies that implement this methodology. For example, Van Ness, Van Ness, and
Warr (2003) set a cut-off score for values of this measure at 2.

(Table 2.d here)

VI. Liquidity:
Average quoted spreads decrease from 5.33 cents to 4.75 cents and this decrease is
significant at the 10% level (t value=1.95). The average effective spread decreased from
3.24 cents to 3.10 cents, although this difference between the effective spreads is not
significant at traditional significant levels. For the control sample, the effective and
quoted spreads decreased from 15.35 cents to 15.23 cents and from 6.92 cents to 6.60
cents, respectively.

However, the changes in effective and quoted spreads are not

significant at the traditional critical values. In nine of the twelve cross-listing groupings,
the quoted spread decreases are significant at the 1% level. This is direct evidence that
the changes in spreads cannot be attributed to a clustering among the cross-listing
groupings.

25

The results of the multivariate liquidity analysis are reported in Table 2.d. Panel A
contains seemingly unrelated regression results for the cross-listing firms, and panel B
contains the estimates from the control sample firms.

The intercept from the

specification using quoted spreads and depth indicates that the quoted spread decreased
17.9% from the pre-listing period to the post-listing period. The intercept from the dollar
depth and effective spread specifications indicate that there was no economic or
statistically significant change from the pre-listing to post-listing period in the crosslisting sample. Panel B contains the estimates from the matched sample of firms. The
intercepts from the quoted spread, effective spread, and dollar depth equations are all
economically and statistically insignificant. The liquidity analysis indicates that the
liquidity of the matched sample of equities did not exhibit a significant change from the
pre-period to the post-period. This, taken with the results from the cross-listing sample,
indicates that the liquidity of the cross-listing firms increased while the liquidity of a
matched sample of equities did not change. In the next section, I discuss the impact that
cross-listing had on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.

VII. Adverse Selection:
I examine adverse selection cost changes around the cross-listing dates for the crosslisting firms and for a matched sample of control firms. To estimate the level of adverse
selection, I employ the method of Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), which decomposes the
spread into adverse selection and order processing components.

This methodology

estimates the proportion of the effective spread that can be attributed to adverse selection.
Similar to George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) assume
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that the specialist’s inventory holding costs are zero, but they allow for a persistence
parameter that captures the probability of trade reversal. The intuition behind the model is
that quotes are revised to reflect information contained in the previous transaction.

The adverse selection and persistence parameters are estimated from the following
equations:

Qt +1 − Qt = λ Z t + ε t +1
Z t +1 = θ Z t + ηt +1
Z t = Pt − Qt
where Qt is the quote midpoint at time t, Pt is the transaction price at time t, ε t +1 and ηt +1
are random error terms, and λ is the proportion of the effective spread that is attributed
to adverse selection. Clark and Shastri (2003) and Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001)
both find that the adverse selection estimates from the Lin, Sanger, and Booth model are
highly correlated with the adverse selection cost estimates produced from other market
microstructure spread decomposition models. Using these adverse selection cost
estimates, I estimate the following model:

LogAdverseRatioj=Β0 + Β1LogPriceRatioj + Β2LogVolumeRatioj + Β3LogStdDevRatioj + εj,

where LogAdverseRatioj is the natural log of the ratio of the average adverse selection
cost of the bid-ask spread in the post-period to the average adverse selection cost of the
bid-ask spread in the pre-period for each firm j. The independent variables
LogPriceRatioj, LogStdDevRatioj, and LogVolumeRatioj represent the ratio of the
average pre to post period price, return standard deviation, and daily volume for firm j,
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respectively. The pre-period is defined as the thirty days preceding the cross-listing of
firm j on the Amex, and the post-period is the thirty days following the cross-listing of
the firm j on the Amex.

(Table 2.e here)

The adverse selection model produced estimates ranging from zero to one for the 120
NASDAQ cross-listing firms over the entire sample period. The mean value of the
adverse selection component estimate was 43%.

The mean dollar spread adverse

selection cost estimate was around one cent for the sample period.
Table2.e contains the parameter estimates of the adverse selection model19. The intercept
from the regression indicates that adverse selection costs do not change from pre-period
to post-period. Adverse selection costs in the control sample increased by .038%, and are
not significant at traditional significance levels. The results indicate that the adverse
selection component of the bid-ask spread in the cross-listing shares did not increase due
to informed trading costs. This result provides direct evidence that the ability of Amex
member firms to delay execution had no impact on the perceived level of informed
trading in the cross-listed firms.

VIII. Impact of UTP Trading:
The liquidity analysis indicates that the liquidity of the NASDAQ 100 increased from the
pre-period to the post-period, while the liquidity of the matched sample remained

19

The adverse selection component estimates are constrained to a 0-1 interval.
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unchanged. Furthermore, the adverse selection analysis suggests that the adverse
selection component of the bid-ask spread of the cross-listing shares does not increase
due to informed trading costs.

These findings suggest that order flow fragmentation has not increased the trading costs
of the cross-listed equities. Furthermore, the ability of Amex floor brokers to delay
execution had no impact on adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. In this
instance, UTP trading acted as a beneficial economic force that lead to a decrease in the
underlying trading cost of the cross-listed securities.

IX. Conclusion:
Is exchange competition a beneficial force that decreases the monopoly rents that
exchanges extract from market participants, or does exchange competition hamper order
flow and decrease market transparency?

On August 12, 2002 the Amex began cross-trading NASDAQ registered securities. This
event provides the opportunity to study the impact of cross-listing (exchange
competition) on trading costs and liquidity. The results of an event study indicate that the
cross-listing of the NASDAQ securities represents a value creating event. Cross-listing
firms’ abnormal returns are positive on the days when positive news is released regarding
Amex UTP cross-listing. The price reactions can be explained by decreased trading costs
decreasing the cost of equity capital, which allow firms to finance projects at lower costs
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of capital. This results also indicate that investors perceive the benefits of exchange
competition to exceed any cost associated cross-listing.

In addition to the event study, I use several measures of market liquidity to measure the
impact of the entrance of the Amex into trading NASDAQ securities. Quoted spreads
significantly decrease when they are cross-listed on the Amex, while there was no impact
on effective spreads. Furthermore, the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread
does not significantly change over the cross-listing period.

In general, my findings suggest that exchange competition is perceived as a net positive
benefit to the investing public. However, cross-listings should be supported by strong
exchange linkages, which support market transparency. The results of this study indicate
that the entrance of an exchange competitor resulted in a significant reduction in trading
costs.
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Table 2.a
Cross-Listing Dates

Date
August 12th, 2002
August 29th, 2002
September 5th, 2002
September 12th, 2002
September 26th, 2002
October 10th, 2002
October 22nd, 2002
October 24th, 2002
October 31st, 2002
November 7th, 2002
November 15th, 2002
November 21st, 2002
Total

Number of
Firms Added
9
12
6
14
10
6
2
15
12
14
10
10
120
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Table 2.b
Event Study

Date

Event Description

December 17, 2001

Files With SEC

August 2, 2002

Acceptance by SEC

August 12, 2002

Trading Begins

August 15, 2002

SEC Suspends Trading

August 23, 2002

SEC Rejects Suspension

Day (0)
AR
-0.006
(.131)
0.030
(.734)
0.006
(.623)
-0.012
(.292)
0.039
(.679)

Day (-1,0)
CAR
.0056
(.524)
1.015
(.672)
-.0382*
(-1.62)
.0032
(.421)
.0124
(0.05)

Sign test
.524
(.40)
.761***
(5.22)
.625**
(2.4)
.321***
(-3.6)
.882***
(7.6)

*** indicates significance 1% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
* indicates Significance 10% level
t-statistic in parentheses
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Table 2.c
Matching Scores

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

UTP

20.86

16.79

15.89

0.72

65.95

Non-UTP

21.04

17.09

15.91

0.63

73.56

Std

UTP
Non-UTP

0.049
0.049

0.044
0.044

0.022
0.023

0.016
0.019

0.130
0.157

Volume

UTP
Non-UTP

5,237,199
4,835,896

2,558,667
2,339,169

8,424,255
9,013,898

288,369
296,683

59,444,221
88,704,786

0.073

0.0255

0.140

0.00054

1.00

Price

Matching Score
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Table 2.d
Univariate Spread, Depth, and Adverse Selection Cost Measures

S and P 500

Mean

LogQuotedRatioj
LogEffectiveRatioj
LogDepthRatioj
LogPriceRatioj,
LogStdDevRatioj,
LogVolumeRatioj
LogLSBRatio

-0.1513
-0.0191
-0.0173
0.0568
-0.1336
-0.0218
-.03751

Standard
Deviation
0.5249
0.0981
0.0541
0.2713
0.3228
0.3925
.02681

Min

Max

-1.9999
-.71213
-.89125
-0.6609
-1.0941
-2.5211
-1.9843

1.9686
1.8032
1.5915
1.7160
0.9436
0.8436
.78623
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Table 2.e
Spreads and Depth Measures

Panel A
Intercept
LogPriceRatio
LogStdDevRatio
LogVolumeRatio
System R2
Cross-Correlation (Error-term)
*** indicates significance 1% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
* indicates Significance 10% level

UTP Cross Listing Firms
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
-.179**
-.0019
(-3.25)
(.0366)
.273
.176
(1.63)
(.974)
.251*
.29687***
(1.94)
(2.74)
-.223
-.211
(-1.10)
(-1.256)
.091
.138
-.178
-.0724

Dollar Depth
-0.0032
(-.10)
0.234
(1.59)
-0.441***
(-4.0)
0.684***
(7.25)
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Table 2.f
Spreads and Depth Measures Controls

Panel B
Intercept
LogPriceRatio
LogStdDevRatio
LogVolumeRatio
System R2
Cross-Correlation (Error-term)
*** indicates significance 1% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
* indicates Significance 10% level

Control Firms
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
0.054
0.007
(.200)
(.811)
0.422***
0.405***
(4.05)
(5.10)
0.216**
0.213**
(2.78)
(2.10)
-0.068
0.0029
(-.971)
(.512)
0.083
0.138
-0.209
-0.099

Dollar Depth
-0.031
(-.721)
0.428***
(6.10)
-0.260***
(-3.96)
0.384***
(3.79)
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Table 2.g
Adverse Selection Model

Intercept
LogPriceRatio
LogStdDevRatio
LogVolumeRatio
Adj R2
F-Test

UTP Cross Listing Firms

Control Firms

Averse Selection
-.0551
(-1.13)
.78
(.751)
.56
(.348)
-.23
(-.320)
.051
2.51

Averse Selection
0.038
(.691)
0.493
(.892)
0.621
(1.19)
-0.38*
(1.892)
0.014
1.55
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Part 3:

Adverse Selection and Exchange Traded Funds
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I. Introduction:
The theoretical work of Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), Kumar and Seppi (1994) and
Subrahmanyam (1991) predict lower adverse selection costs in basket securities relative
to individual equities. In this study, I examine the adverse selection costs and liquidity of
exchange traded funds (ETFs) using a matched sample of equity securities and equity
ETFs. I also explore exchange traded funds specific factors that influence their liquidity
and adverse selection costs. Several studies have examined adverse selection costs in
closed end mutual funds (Chen, Jiang, Kim and McInish (2003), Clark and Shastri
(2001), Neal and Wheatley (1998)), but none have examined these costs in exchange
traded funds.

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are structured differently from closed ends mutual funds.
While many closed end mutual funds trade at a discount or premium to net asset value,
exchange traded funds are easily created and redeemed. The ability to create and redeem
ETFs reduces the difference between the price of the ETF and its net asset value. ETFs
are excellent basket securities to use in an informed trading study because they do not
suffer from large deviation from net asset value (NAV), and thus little uncertainty exists
regarding their liquidation value.

The results of the analysis indicate that exchange traded funds have significantly lower
effective and quoted spreads. Effective spreads are 6.6 cents lower, and quoted spreads
are 13.16 cents lower. ETFs also have $1,475,700 more quoted dollar depth than do the
equities in the control sample. An extended liquidity analysis between ETFs and equity
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securities indicates that sector concentrated ETFs, and ETFs that hold securities from the
broad market, have significant lower quoted spreads and significantly higher quoted
depth than do a matched sample of equities.

In general, baskets that hold international securities have the highest spreads, followed by
equities, followed by sector ETFs, and broad based ETFs have the lowest spreads and
highest quoted depth.

I also find evidence that the number of securities that the ETF

holds decreases the bid-ask spread. The results support the concentrated basket
hypothesis, which conjectures that industry concentration results in reduced liquidity and
higher adverse selection costs.

The remained of the work proceeds as follows: In section II, I discuss the history, trading
mechanics, and general characteristic of exchange traded funds. Section III contains a
review of theories of basket security trading and explores past studies that have examined
informed trading in closed end mutual funds. Section IV contains the hypotheses
development and in section V, I discuss the methods employed to test these hypotheses.
In section VI, I discuss the results of the analysis. In the final section I conclude the
work.
II. Exchange Traded Funds:
Exchange traded funds, or ETFs, are passively managed index funds that allow investors
to trade a basket of securities in one transaction.

ETFs trade intra-day and allow

investors to earn returns that are very similar to those of an underlying index. The
popularity of ETFs has steadily increased since their introduction in the early 1990s.
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As of June 2004 there are over 150 ETFs listed on the American Stock Exchange, and the
Financial Research Corporation predicts that total assets held by ETFs will reach
anywhere between $500 billion to $1 trillion by the year 2007. In 2002 the QQQ had the
second highest volume on the AMEX, NASDAQ, NYSE or regional exchanges, while
the SPDR ranked ninth.

ETFs are lauded for their continuous trading during exchange hours, low
premium/discounts, tax efficiency, diversification benefits, and transparency. Unlike
open-ended mutual funds, which are priced at the end of the day, ETFs trade
continuously throughout the day. Because of the ability to create and redeem ETFs, their
price tends to approximate the net asset value (NAV) of the index20. For instance, since
its inception, the average deviation of the Standard and Poor Depository Receipt’s
(SPDR) price from its NAV has been only .0006%21. The deviation has been .0004% for
the DIA and .0006% for the QQQ. The deviation of exchange traded funds is much
smaller than those found in closed end mutual funds. The average discount of all closed–
end mutual fund on June 30, 2001 was 4.8% and the average discount on equity closedend funds was 11.1%. Annual expense ratios of exchange traded funds are often lower
than those of mutual funds, because of decreased costs associated with marketing and
distribution. Index ETFs are passively managed and, on average, produce lower levels
of capital gains than would be produced by an actively managed fund.

20

See Small (2003) for an empirical analysis of determinants of the price deviations in exchange traded
funds.
21
This figure was calculated using market close net asset values and prices (See Small (2003)).
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The first U.S. exchange-traded fund22, was created as a result of action taken by Leland,
O'Brien, Rubenstein Associates, who lobbied the SEC for the creation of an SandP 500
tracking instrument named the Index Trust SuperUnit. The original SuperTrust was
terminated in 1996, but The American Stock Exchange (Amex) took advantage of the
SuperTrust Order to petition for, and receive, an SEC Order in 1992 to create a standalone SandP 500 Index-based ETF as a unit investment trust. This unit is commonly
known as the Standard and Poor Depository Receipt, or SPDR (Novakoff 2000). Some of
the most popular ETFs include the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Diamonds, DIA), and
the NASDAQ 100 index (Qubes, QQQ).
There are three principal legal structures of index exchange traded funds23. First, ETFs
can take the form of exchange traded open-ended index mutual funds (OETFs). OETFs
are allowed to use derivatives and can make loans to produce income. This form of ETF
is registered under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investment Company Act
of 1940. Dividends are paid quarterly in cash and are reinvested in the fund until
distribution to investors. Examples include iShares and Sector Select SPDRs. The second
form of ETF, is the exchange-traded unit investment trust (UETFs). UETFs are also
registered under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investment Company Act of
1940. Dividends are not reinvested in the fund and are paid quarterly in cash
disbursements. Examples of this form include Diamonds, SPDRs, and Qubes. The third
form is the exchange-traded grantor trust. ETFs of this form are not required to register
under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Investment Company Act of 1940.

22

Exchange traded funds began in Canada. The first fund was listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in
1989.
23
This and other information about ETFs can be found at Etfconnect.com.
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Owners of these ETFs are granted the voting rights of the underlying shares. Dividends
are not reinvested in the index and are distributed to shareholders quarterly. An example
of this form is the HOLDR funds.
An ETF is created when an investor deposits securities and a creation unit is issued. This
process of creation and redemption works to limit the deviation of ETF price from the
ETFs net asset value. The average creation unit multiple is 50,000, and share creation
units range from 25,000 to 600,000 (AMEX 2002).

Recent exchange traded funds related research has included work by Boehmer and
Boehmer (2003), who study the effects on thirty exchange traded funds as they were
cross listed on the NYSE. Elton, Gruber, Comer, and Li (2002) examine deviations in
the SPDRs returns from the returns of an index fund. Hasbrouck (2000) studies price
discovery in the SPDR as well as several sector exchange traded funds. Hedge and
McDermott (2004) examine the liquidity of the component stocks of the NASDAQ 100
and the Dow Diamonds upon their introduction. Lipson and Mortal (2003) study the
impact of SPDRs on the underlying securities. Poterba and Shoven (2002) examine the
tax effects of exchange traded funds. Small (2003) examines the deviations in the prices
of ETF prices from their net asset values. Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2003) also
study the impact of the introduction of the Dow Diamonds on the market quality of the
underlying securities.
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III. Literature Review:
IIIa. Theory:
Theoretical models predict that traders of ETFs will incur lower adverse selection costs
relative to trading in equities. Subrahmanyam (1991) provides a model that demonstrates
how markets in basket securities can provide a preferred trading medium for uninformed
liquidity traders. A positive benefit accrues to uninformed liquidity traders because
security-specific components of adverse selection tend to be diversified away in basket
securities. Consequently, market makers are exposed to lower levels of informed trading
and as a result, adverse selection is decreased in basket securities. Subrahmanyam’s
theory holds that liquidity traders are allowed to realize their trades more efficiently by
trading in basket securities because their losses to informed trading are reduced.
Research by Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) also examines liquidity trading and informed
agents. They present a model where liquidity traders form initial portfolios with
knowledge of their future participation in markets where informed traders are present.
The presence of the informed traders places the liquidity trader at a disadvantage, and the
liquidity traders’ utilities are increased with the introduction of baskets securities.
Liquidity traders can effectively reduce their expected losses of trading with informed
agents if they choose to trade in basket securities.
The models of Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) posit reduced
levels of adverse selection costs in exchange traded funds. Below I review the empirical
evidence produced by mutual funds studies.
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IIIb. Evidence:
The empirical evidence regarding adverse selection costs in basket securities has been
mixed. Neal and Wheatley (1998) estimate the adverse selection component of the bidask spread for 17 mutual funds and a control sample of 17 common stocks. Estimates
from the Glosten and Harris (1988) model average 19% for the funds and 34% for the
control stocks. Neal and Wheatley find that estimates from the George, Kaul, and
Nimalendran (1991) model average 52% and 65%, for funds and control stocks. The
small difference between estimates of the adverse selection component of the spread for
equities and closed end mutual funds presents a problem for Neal and Wheatley. They
state:

“Adverse selection arises primarily from factors other than a firm’s current

liquidation value.”(p.123) They also suggest that the adverse selection spread
decomposition models that they employ may be mis-specified. Later, I argue that this
finding is not puzzling and can be explained by common factors in the portfolio of
underlying securities. Work by Chen et al. (2002) finds evidence of decreased levels of
adverse selection in closed-end mutual finds. Using a sample of funds listed on the
NYSE between 1994 and 1999, they find adverse selection costs to be significantly lower
for the closed end mutual funds than for the control sample of equities. Clark and Shastri
(2001) examine the effects of ownership structure, the expense ratio24, portfolio turnover,
and discount to net asset value on information asymmetry in closed-end mutual funds.
They find block ownership significantly impacts adverse selection costs in closed end
mutual funds, while the other factors are not significant. They also find that adverse
selection costs of these funds are, on average, fifty percent lower than those in a matched
set of equities.
24

The expense ratio represents the ratio of a fund's expenses to its assets.
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While it has generally been accepted that the adverse selection costs of basket securities
are lower than those of individual equities, previous research has provided conflicting
evidence. The next section develops the hypotheses that are tested in this work, and
explains how these hypotheses extend prior works on adverse selection and basket
securities.

IV. Hypothesis Development:
The theoretical predictions of Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), Kumar and Seppi (1994) and
Subrahmanyam (1991) suggest that adverse selection costs of basket securities are lower
than those in a matched sample of equities. These theoretical predictions and evidence
from previous works lead to the first two hypotheses:

Ho (1): Adverse selection costs the same in basket securities (ETFs) as in a matched
sample of equities.

Ho (2): The liquidity of basket securities (ETFs) is the same as that of a matched sample
of equities (e.g. lower bid-ask spreads and higher quoted depth)

One factor of particular interest is the migration of informed trading to sector-specific
exchange-traded funds. Informed traders, who posses firm-specific material nonpublic
information, may choose to migrate from individual securities to industry specific
baskets, because the return characteristics of the basket are likely to be similar to those of
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the individual security and may allow trading on information without detection25. This
would provide informed traders a preferred venue for trading on material non-public
information. Also as a result of possible legal scrutiny of trading the underlying equities,
informed agents may prefer to trade in assets that mask their intentions. Furthermore,
they may choose to trade in securities that have the lowest probability of reveling the
non-public information. This conjecture leads to the third, and fourth hypothesis

Ho (3): Industry concentrated basket securities do not exhibit higher costs associated
with informed trading than baskets of broad market securities.

Ho (4): Industry concentrated basket securities are no less liquid than baskets of broad
market securities. (e.g. higher bid-ask spreads and lower quoted depth)

As the number of securities that a security basket holds increases, the costs associated
with adverse selection should be diversified away. However, on the other hand, the costs
associated with reconstitution increases. This cost could result in a divergence of the
price of the ETF and its underlying basket’s NAV. These possibilities lead to the fifth and
sixth hypothesis:

Ho (5): Trading costs associated with informed trading do change as the number of
securities that a basket securities holds increases.
25

For example, suppose there exists a “basket security” that is focused in the pharmaceutical industry.
Informed traders with firm level information from this industry may prefer to trade in the “basket security”
to avoid detection of the SEC. Industry focused baskets are likely to exhibit return characteristics that are
similar to those of the underlying securities. The return characteristics of ETFs and underlying securities
may become even more correlated with certain security selection methods used by ETFs.
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Ho (6): The liquidity of the basket securities does not change as the number of securities
the basket holds increases.

Furthermore, as the industry concentration of a basket security increases informed agents
propensity to trade in that basket should also increase. This leads to the final two
hypotheses:

Ho (7): Trading costs associated with informed trading leads to no significant change as
the securities in the basket are diversified.

V. Method:
Va. Adverse Selection:
Kyle (1985) suggests market markers increase the bid-ask spread when trading with
informed agents. In practice, market markers are exposed to two types of informed
trading in the securities market. First, they are exposed to trading on firm specific
information. Second, they are exposed to trading by market participants who possess
knowledge regarding impending order flow26. If an informed agent trades on either type
of information, the market marker is forced to match the order at an inferior price. The
prevailing price is inferior because it does not reflect the information that is known by the
informed agent and unknown to the market maker.

26

An example is front running by a trading firm.
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To estimate the level of adverse selection, I employ two spread decomposition
methodologies, and one alternative measure that uses order arrival rates to calculate the
probability of informationally generated trading.

First, I follow the method of Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), which decomposes the bidask spread into order processing and adverse selection components. Second, I employ a
variant of the decomposition method of George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), which
also decomposes the spread into adverse selection and order processing components. The
third method is an alternative measure of adverse selection, which is developed in Easley,
Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996). This model uses order arrival rates to calculate the
probability of informed trading. Each method is discussed in more detail below.
The Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) adverse selection and persistence parameters are
estimated from the following equations:

Qt +1 − Qt = λ Z t + ε t +1
Z t +1 = θ Z t + ηt +1
Z t = Pt − Qt
where Qt is the quote midpoint at time t, Pt is the transaction price at time t, ε t +1 and ηt +1
are random error terms, and λ is the proportion of the effective spread that is attributed
to adverse selection. Clark and Shastri (2001) and Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001)
find that the adverse selection estimates from the Lin, Sanger, and Booth model are
highly correlated with the adverse selection cost estimates produced from other market
microstructure spread decomposition models.
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George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) (GKN) define transactions returns as:
Rt = Et + π (

sq
2

)(Qt − Qt −1 ) + (1 − π )(

sq
2

)Qt + U t ,

The GKN’s methodology estimates the realized spread SBi as:

S Bi = 2 − Cov( RDBi ,t RDBi ,t −1 ) .
where RDBi,t is defined as the difference between transaction returns RTi,t and returns
based on unobservable true prices Rmi,t for security i at time t. GKN suggest that the bid
price subsequent to a transaction should be used as the unobservable true price. The GKN
technique overcomes the assumption of price independence but their process for
decomposing the bid-ask spread is based on two key assumptions. They assume that the
sequence of buys and sell order are serially uncorrelated, and they assume that the quoted
spread is constant across transactions. Kim and Ogden (1996) provide evidence that the
GKN estimates of the adverse selection and order processing costs are biased. Another
criticism of the GKN model is that it assumes a constant spread for each security. Alford
and Jones (1996) implement a variant of the model that allows the quoted spread to vary
with each observation. They specify the model as:

∆RitD = π 0 + π 1 ( Sit / 2)(Qt − Qt −1 )
where ∆RitD = RitD − RiD(t −1) and RitD = RitT − RitQ . Qt takes the value of one when the
transaction is a purchase and –1 when the transaction is a sale. RitT is the return for stock i
at time t based on the vector of prices, and RitQ is the return for security i at time t derived
from the vector of quoted mid-points. π 1 represents the order processing component of
the bid-ask spread, and (1- π 1 ) is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.
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Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) derive a model that provides an estimate of
the level of informed trading. The model derives estimates of the probability of
informationally driven trading, and can be estimated using only daily number of buys (B)
and sells (S). Under the assumptions of the model, good news arrives with probability 1-

δ and bad news arrives with probability δ. News arrives on informative days, which are
assumed to occur with probability α , with nature determining their occurrence. µ is the
arrival rate of trades that can distinguish between good news and bad news days, and ε
signifies the arrival rate of trades that cannot distinguish between good and bad new days.
The probability of observing B and S on a day of length t is:
(ε T ) B (ε T ) S
(ε T ) B − ( u +ε )T [(u + ε )T ]s
+ αδ *e− et
e
B!
S!
B!
S!
B
s
[(u + ε )T ] −ε T (ε T )
+ α (1 − δ ) * e − (u +ε )
e
B!
S!

L( B, S | θ ) = (1 − α ) * e −ε t

If the series is independent, the likelihood of the observed values over I days is the
product of the likelihoods:
I

L( M | θ ) = ∏ L(θ | Bi , Si )
i =1

The probability of informed trading (PIN) given by the expression:

PIN =

αv
α u + 2ε
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Vb. Data:
All transactions data are collected from The New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote
(TAQ) database, and are filtered using methods similar to those used in and Lipson and
Mortal (2003). I exclude the following data points:
•

Non-positive prices and quotes

•

All quotes with a time stamp before 9:30am or after 4:00pm

•

Quoted with zero sizes bid or offer sizes

•

Trading prices and midpoint greater than 50% over their previous level

Buys and sells are classified using the methodology of Lee and Ready (1990). I excluded
Bond ETF’s spreads because they are unlikely to exhibit characteristics that are indicative
of those of equity funds. Data are collected for all trading days in 2003. Spreads, adverse
selection cost estimates, and control variables are averaged over the examination period,
which produces one observation for each exchange trades fund variable. Price, volume,
and return data are collected from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database. Classification for industry, broad market, and international ETFs are taken from
the American Stock Exchange’s website, and ETF security holding information is
obtained from Morningstar.
Vc. Matching Methodology:
To examine the levels of adverse selection between equities and ETFs, I develop a
matching sample of equity securities. The matching method is similar27 to the one
imposed in Clarke and Shastri (2001) and in Huang and Stoll (1996). However, I match
27

Unlike Clarke and Shastri (2001), I do not match on market capitalization, because the market
capitalization of ETFs and the market capitalization of equities do not capture the same factor.
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on price, volume and return volatility. First, available matching equities are identified
from TAQ, and volume, return, and price data are obtained from CRSP.

The data are averaged daily over all trading days in 2003, and the equity security that
minimizes the following objective is selected as the matching equity:

 Price non-etf − Priceetf
i
i
Matching Score = 
non-etf
etf
Price
+Price
i
i

2


2

 
  Volume non-etf − Volumeetf
i
i
 +
non-etf
etf
Volume
+Volume
i
i
 
2
 

2

 
  STD non-etf − STD etf
i
i
 +
non-etf
etf
STD
+STD
i
i
 
2
 







2

(Table 3.a here)
Price is the end of day price of the security averaged over the year, STD is the daily
standard deviation of daily returns estimated over the year, and Volume28 is the daily
volume of security averaged daily over the year. This process provides one matched
security to each ETF.

The values obtained from the matching process are presented in table 3.a. The average
price of the ETFs is $48.15 and the average price of the matching securities is $40.18.
The mean daily return standard deviation of the ETFs is 1.30% and the mean daily return
standard deviation for the matched sample is 1.645%. The average volume for the ETFs
was 1,455,758 shares and the average volume of the matched sample was 1,050,153. The
average matching score of .5361 suggests that the firms included in the two samples are
similar along the pre-specified attributes. For example, Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr

28

NASDAQ volume is adjusted to sixty percent of its original amount to facilitate matching across
exchanges. Volume in dealer markets is overstated because of inter-dealer trading. (see Anderson and Dyl
(2003)).
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(2003) set a cut of score for values of this measure at 2. The matched portfolio acts as a
benchmark for drawing conclusions regarding spread and adverse selection costs in the
cross-security analysis.

I also create a second sample of matching firms through a random selection process.
First, I delete all firms listed in the CRSP database that have reported returns on fewer
than 240 days for 2003. I further restrict the sample to firms listed on the NYSE and
AMEX, the primary exchanges where ETFs trade. Including only firms listed on these
two exchanges should control for any exchange effects associated with spreads and depth
quotation. This reduction procedure reduces the universe of matching securities to 4006
firms. Every thirty-sixth firm is chosen as the matching firm, which results in 111
controls firms, each of which is matched to an ETF. I estimate of the following liquidity
analysis using both samples, and the results for the random sample are presented in
Appendix.

VI. Liquidity Analysis:
After selecting the matching firms, estimates of the bid ask spread and a dollar depth
measurement are employed in the analysis. The first measure, the quoted spread, is
calculated as QSt = Askt − Bidt , where Askt is the ask price at time t and Bidt is the bid at
time t. This measure of the spread does not consider trades that take place inside the best
bid-best offer quote. Lee (1993), Huang and Stoll (1996) suggest the use of the effective
spread, which is calculated as ES = 2 pt − MPt , where pt is the price at time t, and MPt
is the quote midpoint at time t. I also estimate dollar depth, which is the sum of the depth
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at the bid and ask prices, and represents the number of shares multiplied times the
prevailing price.

All three measures are used in the estimation of the first liquidity

specification. The model is estimated as:

Liquidity i = α i + β 1 Price i + β 2 SD i + β 3 Vol i + β 4 ETFi + ei .

Where Liquidityi takes the value of the quoted spread, the effective spread, and dollar
depth for each firm i. Price is the end of day price of the security averaged over the year,
SD is the daily standard deviation of daily returns estimated over the year, Vol is the daily
volume of security averaged daily over the year, and ETF is a binary variable that takes
the value of unity when the security is an exchange traded fund.

(Table 3.b and 3.c here)

The results of the liquidity analysis can be found in table 3.c. The binary variables ETF
is negative and significant in the quoted spread regression. Quoted spreads are 9 cents
lower than those in a matched sample of equities, while controlling for price, volume and
standard deviation. The coefficient estimate on ETF in the effective spread regression
indicates that effective spreads are 1 cent lower in exchange traded funds, however, this
value is not statistically significant. The ETF coefficient estimate in the dollar depth
specification indicated that ETFs have $1,475,700 more dollar depth than do a matched
sample of equities. The positive and significant coefficient estimate on the ETF binary
variable in the dollar depth specification and the negative and significant coefficient
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estimate on ETF in the quoted spread analysis suggest that exchange traded funds exhibit
higher levels of liquidity than a matched sample of equities.

I extend the previous model to allow for industry concentration effects to measure further
the spread differential between exchange traded funds and equities. This model
estimation allows an examination of the relationship between industry concentration and
security liquidity. I estimate the following OLS model:

Liquidityi = α i + β1Pricei + β 2SDi +β 3 Voli + β 4 Internationali
+ β5Sectori + β 6 Broad i + ei

Where Liquidity takes the value of the quoted spread, the effective spread, and dollar
depth for each firm i. Price is the end of day price of the security averaged over the year,
SD is the daily standard deviation of daily returns estimated over the year, Vol is the daily
volume of security averaged daily over the year, International is a binary variable that
takes the value of one when the ETF primarily holds non-U.S. denominated securities,
Sector is a binary variable that takes the value of one when the ETF primarily holds
securities in the same industry sector, Broad is a binary variable that takes the value of
one when the ETF primarily holds securities from many diverse industry groups, and
Equity is a binary variable that takes the value of one when the security is an equity
securities.

The results of the analysis can be found in table 3.d. As expected, industry concentration
has a significant impact on basket security liquidity.

The quoted spread analysis
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indicates that internationally concentrated baskets have higher quoted spreads than do
equities, while sector and broad market baskets both have lower quoted spreads.
broad market baskets have the lowest quoted spreads in the group.

But

This result is

consistent with the concentration hypothesis, because the concentration hypothesis
suggests that as industry basket concentration the liquidity of the basket decreases. The
coefficient estimate on sector suggests that sector concentrated ETFs have quoted spreads
that are, on average, 11.56 cents lower than those in a matched sample of equities. The
coefficient estimate on broad indicates that broad market ETFs have, on average, quoted
spreads which are 18.47 cents lower than those of a matched sample of equities. Further,
the parameter estimates on these variables in the dollar depth specification, indicate that
sector ETFs have $1,653,800 more dollar depth and broad market ETFs have $2,793,500
more dollar depth than the matched sample of equities. Again, both results support the
concentration hypothesis.

(Table 3.d here)

To explore further the relationship between ETF concentration and adverse selection
costs, I estimate the adverse selection components of the bid-ask spread for each
exchange traded fund and security using the Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) and a variant
of the George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) decomposition methods, and I also derive
estimates for the Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) model. The following
OLS specification is estimated for the ETFs and the matched sample of equities:
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Adverse S electioni = α i + β 1 Price i + β 2 SD i + β 3 Vol i + β 4 ETFi + ei

Where Price is the end of day price of the security averaged over the year, SD is the daily
standard deviation of daily returns estimated over the year, Vol is the daily volume of
security averaged daily over the year, and ETF is a binary variable that takes the value of
unity when the security is an exchange traded fund. The dependent variable Adverse
selection takes the value of the three adverse selection/informed trading models (Lin,
Sanger, and Booth (1995), George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), and Easley, Kiefer,
O’Hara, and Paperman (1996)).
(Table 3.e here)

The results of the adverse selection estimation are shown in Table 3.e. In the Lin,
Sanger, and Booth and in the Alford and Jones (1996) variant of George, Kaul and
Nimalendran (1991) the coefficient estimate on ETF is negative and significant, but the
coefficient estimate in the Easley et al. specification is not significant. However, a single
binary variable specification does not capture the dynamics of the concentration
hypothesis. Again, I extend the single binary model to allow for industry concentration
effects to measure further the adverse selection cost differential between exchange traded
funds and equities. The estimated model is:

Adverse Selectioni = α i + β1Pricei + β 2SDi +β 3 Voli + β 4 Internationali
+ β5Sectori + β 6 Broad i + ei
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Where Price is the end of day price of the security averaged over the year, SD is the daily
standard deviation of daily returns estimated over the year, Vol is the daily volume of
security averaged daily over the year, International is a binary variable that takes the
value of one when the security primarily holds non-U.S. denominated securities, Sector is
a binary variable that takes the value of one when the ETF primarily holds securities in
the same industry sector, Broad is a binary variable that takes the value of one when the
ETF primarily holds securities from many diverse industry groups, and Equity is a binary
variable that takes the value of one when the security is an equity. The dependent variable
AS takes the value of the three adverse selection/informed trading models (Lin, Sanger,
and Booth (1995), a variant of George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), and Easley,
Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996)).

(Table 3.f here)

The industry concentration adverse selection model estimates are included in table 3.f.
The Lin, Sanger, Booth coefficient estimates on Sector are negative and significant, and
the coefficient estimate on Broad is also negative and significant. The coefficient
estimates suggest that, on average, sector ETFs adverse selection costs are 1.77 cents less
and broad market ETFs are 2.56 cents less than a matched sample of equity securities.
The estimates of the Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) suggest that
international ETFs have significantly higher levels of informed trading, while broad
market ETFs have significantly lower levels of informed trading than a matched set of
equities. The results suggest that international concentrated basket securities have the
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highest adverse selection costs, followed by equities, followed by sector concentrated
baskets, which are followed by broad market baskets.

These results support the

concentration hypothesis, with the exception of the international baskets. Because of the
information asymmetry that exists across national borders, the securities that these
baskets hold exhibit larger adverse selection costs than do the equities in the control
sample, even after the diversification benefits are taken into account. However, the
concentration hypothesis works quite well explaining the adverse selection costs in the
domestic securities.
The second section of this work contains estimates from an intra-exchange traded fund
examination of liquidity and adverse selection. The models in this section are constructed
to capture factors that contribute to exchange traded fund’s liquidity and adverse
selections costs. The first model that is estimated is the basic liquidity model, and it takes
the following form:

Liquidtyi = α i + β1Pricei + β 2SDi +β 3 Voli + β 4 Internationali
+ β5 Numberi + β 6 Herfindahli + β 7Sectori + ei

Liquidity takes the value of the quoted spread, the effective spread, and dollar depth for
each firm i averaged for every observation over 2003. Price is the end of day price of the
security averaged over the year, SD is the daily standard deviation of daily returns
estimated over the year, Vol is the daily volume of security averaged daily over the year,
International is a binary variable that takes the value of unity when the exchange traded
fund holds primarily non-U.S. securities, Sector is a binary variable that takes the value
of unity when the exchange traded fund is a sector/industry fund, Number is the number
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of securities that the ETF holds in its portfolio, and Herfindahl is a concentration measure
of the top five holding of the ETF.

(Table 3.g)

The results of the ETF liquidity analysis are presented in table 3.g. Broad is the reference
group for the binary variables International and Sector. The coefficient estimates on
International, in the quoted spread specification, indicates that while controlling for
volume, price, and standard deviation exchange traded funds that hold international
securities have quoted spreads that are 8.5 cents higher, on average, than ETFs that hold
broad market securities. The quoted spread analysis indicated no significant difference
between the quoted spreads of Sector ETFs and Broad market ETFs. The effective
spread analysis indicates that as the number of securities increases the effective spread
decreases. Further more, in the dollar depth analysis, the dollar depth of ETFs that hold
international securities is $2,306,800 dollars less than those that hold broad market
securities.

These results further provide evidence that concentration influences the

liquidity of basket securities.

The second model is the adverse selection model, and it takes the following form29

29

To test for non-linearity in the relationship between the number of securities a basket security holds and
adverse selection costs, the model is also estimated including a variable that measures the number of
securities squared. However, the results of the analysis do not quantitatively differ form those presented
here.
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Adverse Selectioni = α i + β1Pricei + β 2SDi +β 3 Voli + β 4 Internationali
+ β 5 Numberi + β 6 Herfindahli + β 7Sectori + ei

The dependent variable Adverse Selection takes the value of the three adverse
selection/informed trading models (Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995), George, Kaul, and
Nimalendran (1991), and Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996)). Price is the end
of day price of the security averaged over the year, SD is the daily standard deviation of
daily returns estimated over the year, Vol is the daily volume of security averaged daily
over the year, International is a binary variable that takes the value of unity when the
exchange traded fund holds a significant portion of non-U.S. securities, Sector is a binary
variable that takes the value of unity when the exchange traded fund is a sector/industry
fund, Number is the number of securities that the ETF holds in its portfolio, and
Herfindahl is a concentration measure of the top five holding of the ETF. The intraexchange traded fund adverse selection costs analysis suggests that foreign and sector
ETFs, on average, exhibit higher adverse selection costs than do ETFs that wide spectrum
of securities from many industries. The intra-exchange traded fund liquidity analysis
suggest that ETFs hold international securities, on average, exhibit larger spreads and less
depth than do ETFs that wide spectrum of securities from many industries.

(Table 3.h)

Table 3.h contain the estimates from the intra-ETF adverse selection analysis. The
coefficient estimate on International in the Lin, Sanger, and Booth estimation indicates
that exchange traded funds that hold international securities have, on average, adverse
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selection costs that are 2.53 cents higher than ETFs that hold broad market securities. The
coefficient estimate on Sector indicates that ETFs that hold securities concentrated in one
industry also have significantly higher adverse selection costs than do ETFs that hold
securities from many industries. Estimates from the Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and
Paperman (1996) specification suggest that foreign securities exhibit increases informed
trading cost. The intra-exchange traded fund adverse selection costs analysis suggests
that foreign and sector ETFs, on average, exhibit higher adverse selection costs than do
ETFs that contain a wide spectrum of securities from many industries. Again, these
results support the concentration hypothesis.

VII. Conclusion:
This essay examines adverse selection costs and liquidity of exchange traded funds
(ETFs) using a matched sample of equity securities and equity ETFs, and also explores
exchange traded funds specific factors that influence their liquidity and adverse selection
costs.
The results of the analysis indicate that exchange traded funds have significantly lower
effective and quoted spreads than a matched sample of equities. Effective spreads are 6.6
cents lower, and quoted spreads are 13.16 cents lower than the sample of equities. ETFs
also have $1,475,700 more quoted dollar depth than do the equities in the control sample.
An extended liquidity analysis between ETFs and equity securities indicates that sector
concentrated ETFs and ETFs that hold securities from the broad market have significant
lower quoted spreads and significantly higher quoted depth than do a matched sample of
equities.
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In general international baskets have the highest spreads, followed by equities, followed
by sector ETFs, and broad based ETFs have the lowest spreads and highest quoted depth.
I also find some support that the number of securities that the ETF holds decreases the
bid-ask spread. The results support the concentrated basket hypothesis, which conjectures
that industry concentration results in reduced liquidity and higher adverse selection costs.
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Table 3.a
ETF Matching Scores

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

ETF

48.1581

42.32

32.3625

2.58

132.96

Non-ETF

40.1842

31.25

44.1634

3.14

384.28

Volume

ETF
Non-ETF

1,455,758
1,050,153

85,392
70,871

8,362,245
5,750,729

2,662
3,097

77,513,826
58,394,344

STD

ETF
Non-ETF

.01317
.01645

.0011
.0157

.0038
.0053

.007
.004

.0034
.0268

.5361

.1759

.658

.0067

2.10

Price

Matching Score
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Table 3.b
Exchange Traded Fund Univariate Characteristics

ETFs

Mean

Quoted Spreads
Effective Spreads
Depth
Number
Foreign
Sector
Broad
LSB
GKN
Easley et al.

.224
.177
2,160,100
260
.231
.490
.277
3.2
12.4
.122

Standard
Deviation
.144
.111
2,087,584
473
.423
.502
.449
.132
.02
.076

Max

Min

.782
.540
12,209,540
2891
1
1
1
1
1
.465

.017
.023
58,834
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 3.c
Exchange Traded Fund and Equity Spread Analysis

Intercept
Price
SD
Volume
ETF
Adjusted R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Spreads and Depth
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
.1316**
.0663**
(2.20)
(2.037)
.0003***
.002***
(9.20)
(10.36)
2.67
.696
(.87)
(.418)
-4.16E-08***
-2.43E-08***
(-4.25)
(-4.56)
-.09***
-.011408
(-3.12)
(-.72)
.3508
.4029
27.97***
34.93***

Dollar Depth
1,535,400**
(1.95)
933,400*
(1.65)
-96,370,700**
(-2.49)
-.04
(-1.47)
1,475,700***
(3.669)
.2538
17.06***
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Table 3.d
Exchange Traded Fund and Equity Spread Extended Analysis

Intercept
Price
SD
Volume
International
Sector
Broad
Adjusted R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Spreads and Depth
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
.12**
.068**
(2.21)
(2.077)
.003***
.0021***
(10.41)
(10.16)
1.85
.4623
(.622)
(.27411)
-4.18e-08***
-2.45e-08***
(-4.43)
(-4.57)
.043882
.0205
(1.00)
(.828)
-.1156***
.015482
(-3.50)
(.4153)
-.1847***
-.008250
(-4.2)
(-.7411)
.403
.4060
23.149***
23.35***

Dollar Depth
1,538,600**
(2.027)
393,400
(.9719)
-83,954,800**
(-2.14)
-.038
(-1.34)
-18,500
(-.07)
1,653,800***
(4.407)
2,793,500***
(4.155)
.338
17.4533***
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Table 3.e
Exchange Traded Fund and Equity Adverse Selection Analysis

Intercept
Price
SD
Volume
ETF
Adjusted R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Adverse Selection Analysis
Lin, Sanger, and Booth
GKN-Alford and Jones
.046***
.102
(4.889)
(1.55)
8.31E-05
.002***
(1.415)
(3.16)
-.1966
2.77
(-.40)
(.971)
-4.44E-09***
-3.12e-08***
(2.855)
(-3.90)
-.01644***
-.084***
(-3.5755)
(-3.22)
.077
.270
5.40***
19.23***

Easley et al.
.0969***
(4.7518)
2.39E-05
(.225)
.690
(.721)
7.79E-09***
(2.77)
.0002
(.8231)
.025
1.29
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Table 3.f
Exchange Traded Fund and Equity Adverse Selection Extended Analysis

Intercept
Price
SD
Volume
International
Sector
Broad
Adjusted R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Adverse Selection Costs
Lin, Sanger, and Booth
GKN-Alford and Jones
.0451***
.097
(4.89)
(1.59)
.00012*
.002***
(2.00)
(4.06)
-.2848
2.33
(-.584)
(.812)
-4.46e-09***
-3.13e-08***
(-2.892)
(-3.80)
.00559
.029389
(.78)
(.610)
-.0177***
-.1109***
(-3.29)
(4.365)
-.025648***
-.1514***
(-3.56)
(4.288)
.116
.320
4.4883***
16.18***

Easley et al.
.090567***
(4.56)
.00011
(1.29)
.5851
(.5914)
7.80e-09***
(2.788)
.0347*
(1.656)
-.006528
(-.583)
-.01432*
(-1.94)
.054
1.26
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Table 3.g
Intra-ETF Liquidity Analysis

Intercept
Price
Volume
SD
International
Sector
Herfindahl
Number
Adjusted R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Spreads and Depth
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
.192213***
.0166***
(3.098)
(3.11)
.0011**
.001**
(2.138)
(2.59)
-4.03e-10
-5.97e-10
(-.3939)
(-.511)
-1.98
-1.611
(-.644)
(-.7011)
.08588**
.0325
(1.993)
(.9500)
-.0134
-.021
(-.453)
(-.5309)
4.06e-08
3.28e08
(1.587)
(1.409)
-2.63e-05
-4.56e-05**
(-1.20)
(-2.14)
.10
.21
1.63
3.846

Dollar Depth
3,732,400***
(4.47)
75,800
(.099)
-.003*
(-1.83)
-80,356,600*
(-1.776)
-2,306,800***
(3.548)
-259,100
(-.373)
2.54***
(6.574)
1,009
(.9343)
.29
5.91
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Table 3.h
Intra-ETF Adverse Selection Analysis

Intercept
Price
Volume
SD
International
Sector
Herfindahl
Number
Adjusted R2
F-Test
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Adverse Selection Costs
GKN-Alford and
Lin, Sanger, and Booth
Jones
.013*
.1036*
(1.722)
(1.838)
.00001
.001***
(1.32)
(2.65)
-5.31e-10**
-2.99e-08**
(-2.74)
(-2.09)
-.42
-793
(-.80)
(-.25)
.0253***
.1049**
(2.97)
(2.60)
.0095**
.005
(2.033)
(.203)
4.92e-06
4.05e-08**
(.37)
(2.36)
1.49e-06
3.39e-06
(.70)
(.8514)
.12
.147
1.93*
2.45**

Easley et al.
.0658
(.0903)
.0003**
(2.257)
5.80e-09
(.843)
2.665
(1.567)
.0369*
(1.71)
.000876
(.0435)
-8.86e-08***
(-7.466)
1.46e-06
(.9526)
.096
5.10***

81

Appendix 2.a
Robustness
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Table 3.i
Exchange Traded Fund and Equity Spread Analysis (Random Sample)

Intercept
Price
Standard Deviation
Volume
ETF
System R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Spreads and Depth
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
.091***
.0328
(5.27)
(1.21)
.0007***
.002**
(4.14)
(2.75)
1.01*
.243**
(1.89)
(2.38)
-3.76E-09*
-1.78E-07***
(-1.99)
(-6.92)
-.0531***
-.02691
(-4.94)
(-1.25)
.4905
.3786
10.48***
15.61***

Dollar Depth
2,036,100
(1.23)
56,900**
(2.96)
-150,631,100**
(-10.64)
-.0006*
(-1.59)
6,302,500***
(3.58)
.1584
21.96***

83

Table 3.j
ETF and Equity Spread Extended Analysis (Random Sample)

Intercept
Price
SD
Volume
International
Sector
Broad
Adjusted R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Spreads and Depth
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
.101***
.0354
(3.01)
(1.27)
.00065***
.0027***
(9.36)
(8.34)
1.022*
.2513*
(1.96)
(2.12)
-3.69e-09***
-1.79e-07***
(2.38)
(-6.12)
.07284*
.0372
(1.86)
(.694)
-.1507**
-.00531
(-2.15)
(-1.12)
-.1662***
-.0189*
(-3.24)
(1.97)
.5512
.3816
15.95***
17.48***

Dollar Depth
2,031,200**
(2.02)
45,200*
(1.9719)
-145,237,100**
(-7.25)
-.00063*
(-1.72)
-56,500
(-.58)
1,209,700***
(4.40)
3,501,400***
(5.23)
.2841
22.43***
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Table 3.k
ETF and Equity Adverse Selection Extended Analysis (Random Sample)

Intercept
Price
SD
Volume
International
Sector
Broad
Adjusted R2
F Value
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

Adverse Selection Costs
Lin, Sanger, and Booth
GKN-Alford and Jones
.0313**
.0151
(2.51)
(1.24)
.00502***
.0004***
(5.14)
(3.16)
-.763
4.25*
(-.176)
(1.72)
-7.37e-10***
-2.52e-07***
(-8.964)
(-4.41)
.003*
.04664
(1.89)
(.567)
-.0092**
-.1443***
(-2.65)
(7.61)
-.01257***
-.135***
(-5.36)
(3.57)
.157
.295
3.694***
9.46***

Easley et al.
.0425*
(1.66)
.0031
(.76)
.4577*
(1.951)
5.82e-08***
(6.17)
.1189
(.942)
.006528**
(2.393)
-.0232*
(-1.78)
.071
4.71***

85

Part 4:

The Liquidity Impact of Concentrated Basket Security
Introduction
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I. Introduction:
The popularity of index products has increased exponentially since the introduction of the
first U.S. exchange traded fund, the Standard and Poor Depository Receipt, in 1993. As
of December 2003 the NASDAQ 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ) and Standard and
Poor Depository Receipt (SPDR) have average daily volumes of 86,000,000 and
50,000,000 shares, respectfully.
As of June 2003, 153 ETFs trade on U.S. exchanges. There are twenty-four broad
market, thirty-five foreign focused, and fifty sector or industry specific exchange traded
funds30. Among the newest additions to the family of sector specific exchange traded
funds are the Select Sector Standard and Poor Depository Receipts (Sector SPDRs). The
equities that comprise the sector SDPRs are selected from the universe of SandP 500
firms. For example, if the nine Sector SDPRs were purchased in balance to the weighting
of the underlying equities within the SandP 500 index, the returns would replicate the
return on the SandP 500 index. The Sector SRDR exchange traded funds allow investors
the opportunity to over or under weight sectors based on expected performance.

Of particular interest to market participants and regulators is the impact of the
introduction of basket securities on the underlying securities. The principle issue
surrounds the impact of the basket’s introduction on the liquidity and bid-ask spread of
the underlying equities. Several studies have examined this issue (see Lipson and Mortal
(2003), Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2003), and Hegde and McDermott (2003)).
However, this is the first study to examine the impact of the introduction of concentrated
30

The remaining ETFs are bond and REIT funds.
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baskets on the underlying securities. In particular, this study documents the liquidity and
adverse selection changes in the underlying securities around the introduction of the S
and P 500 sector exchange traded funds (Sector-SDPRs).

Around the introduction date of the SPDR Sector ETFs, I find that the underlying equities
quoted spreads increase by 3% while dollar depth decreases by 6%, while controlling for
volume, standard deviation, and price. Estimates of the adverse selection component of
the bid ask spread increase by 2.17%. The results of this investigation suggest that
uninformed traders, traders who do not posses non-public information, migrate from
trading in the underlying securities to the baskets securities. The concentrated basket
hypothesis, which conjectures that informed traders migrate to the Sector-SDPR baskets
because they are industry concentrated, is not supported. The results of this study support
those of early basket introduction studies.

The remained of this work proceed as follows. In section II, I discuss the underlying
theory of adverse selection in basket securities. Section IIb. examines the results of
previous studies. In section III, I explore the hypotheses of this essay, and in section IV I
discuss the methods employed to test these hypotheses. The final section, V, concludes
the work.
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II. Literature Review
IIa.Theory:
According to Subrahmanyam (1991), liquidity traders are allowed to realize their trades
more efficiently by trading in basket securities. Adverse selection costs are reduced in
baskets because these costs tend to be diversified across asset classes. As a result, basket
securities offer lower levels of potential losses to informed trading. As uninformed
traders migrate to basket securities, the ratio of informed agents trading in the underlying
securities increases and market makers respond with increased bid-ask spreads. Gorton
and Pennacchi (1993) present a model where liquidity traders form initial portfolios with
knowledge of their future participation in markets where informed traders are present.
The presence of the informed traders places the liquidity trader at a disadvantage, and the
liquidity traders’ utilities are increased with the introduction of baskets securities.
Liquidity traders can effectively reduce their expected losses of trading against informed
agents if they trade in the basket securities. Below I discuss the evidence that has been
presented in the literature on basket trading.

IIb.Evidence:
Several studies have examined the introduction of security baskets on the underlying
equities. Lipson and Mortal (2003) examine the effect of Standard and Poor Depository
Receipt (SPDR) introduction on the underlying securities of the index. They document a
negligible effect on the liquidity of the underlying stocks, but report a reduction in quoted
depth. Lipson and Mortal also report an increased adverse selection component of the
bid-ask spread in the underlying equities after the introduction of the SPDR exchange
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traded fund. Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2003) examine the impact of the
introduction of the Dow Jones Industrial (DIA) exchange traded fund on the underlying
equities. They document increased bid-ask spreads in the underlying equities, but find no
significant change in adverse selection costs. Hegde and McDermott (2003) examine the
introduction31 of the Nasdaq 100 (QQQ) exchange traded fund on the liquidity and
adverse selection costs of the underlying stocks. They document decreased adverse
selection costs and increased liquidity in the underlying equities32. Ackert and Tian
(1999) find that mispricing of index options decreases after the introduction of the
Standard and Poor 500 (SPDR) fund. Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam (1993) examine the
impact of the introduction of S and P 500 futures contracts on the bid-ask spread of the
underlying securities. They find a significant increase in the spreads of the underlying
securities and no significant change in their adverse selection costs.

III. Hypotheses:
The introduction of a broad-based basket security is expected to have an impact on the
underlying securities different from that of the introduction of a sector specific fund.
With the introduction of a broad based basket security, uninformed trades are expected to
migrate to the basket security and informed traders are expected to continue to trade in
the underlying asset. This in turn, increases the costs of trading in the underlying

31

Hegde and McDermott (2003) also examine the introduction of the Diamonds (DIA). Their findings are
consistent with those of Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2003).
32
Hegde and McDermott’s results are counter to the predictions of Subrahmanyam. However, they are
easily explained by my conjectures in section III. If the correlations among the underlying equities and the
Nasdaq 100 index are large compared to those in a broad based fund, informed traders are more likely to
migrate to the basket security.
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securities because market makers increase the bid-ask spread and decrease quoted depth
when the probability of trading with informed agents increases.

Given the high concentration of individual equities in sector specific exchange traded
funds, and because of the high correlation between the returns of the underlying equities
in sector funds, the return characteristics of the basket are expected to have higher
correlations with the underlying securities than the underlying securities in a broad based
basket. This in turn leads to increased levels of informed trading in the sector specific
baskets. Also as a result of possible legal scrutiny of trading the underlying equities,
informed agents may prefer to trade in assets that mask their intentions. Furthermore,
informed traders prefer trade in securities that have the lowest probability of reveling the
non-public information. This conjecture leads to the two hypotheses that are tested in
this work:

Ho (1): The introduction of industry concentrated basket securities will lead to the
migration of informed trading from the underlying securities to the concentrated basket,
resulting in an increase in the liquidity of the underlying securities. (e.g lower bid-ask
spreads and greater quoted depth.)

Ho (2): The introduction of industry concentrated basket securities will lead to the
migration of informed trading from the underlying securities to the concentrated basket,
resulting a decrease in the adverse selection costs of the underlying securities.
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Broad market baskets securities allow uniformed traders to reduce their expected losses
associated with informed trading. The introduction of a broad market basket security
should decrease the likelihood of uniformed trading in the individual securities and would
result in a transition of uninformed trading to the basket security from the underlying
securities. This would result in decreased liquidity of the individual securities. On the
other hand, the introduction of a concentrated basket security may attract informed
traders, and decrease the costs of informed trading in the underlying securities.

IV. Method:
IVa. Data.
All transactions data are collected from The New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote
(TAQ) database, and are filtered using methods similar to those used in and Lipson and
Mortal (2003). I exclude the following data points:
•

Non-positive prices and quotes

•

All quotes with a time stamp before 9:30am or after 4:00pm

•

Quoted with zero sizes bid or offer sizes

•

Trading prices and midpoint greater than 50% over their previous level

Less than 1 percent of the observations are removed using these filters.
Buys and sells are classified using the methodology of Lee and Ready (1990).
Transaction data is collected for 30 trading days before and 30 trading days after the day
of introduction of the introduction of the SPDR-Sector ETFs. December 22, 1998, the
day of SPDR-Sector ETF introductions, is excluded from the analysis. Daily price,
volume, and return data are collected from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
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database, and the underlying securities of the S and P 500 were obtained from Standard
and Poor’s Securities Inc.

IVb. Matching:
I create a matched portfolio to act as a benchmark for drawing conclusions regarding
spread and depth changes around the introduction of the Sector-SDPR ETFs. To provide
an estimate of changes in market liquidity during the sample period, I compare the
trading costs of the underlying securities to those in the control sample. Average daily
volume33, stock price, and shares outstanding are averaged over the 60 days, centered on
the day of the sector SPDR introduction for both matching and cross-listing firms. The
matching method is similar to the one employed by Clarke and Shastri (2001). Matching
firms34 must have traded for more than one year and not undergone a suspension of
trading during the sixty-day window immediately preceding the introduction of the
basket security.

Firms that minimize the following expression are selected at the

matching equities:
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− PriceS&P
i
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The matched portfolio acts as a benchmark for drawing conclusions regarding spread and
depth changes. The values obtained from the matching process are presented in table 4.a.

33

Volume in dealer markets is overstated because of inter-dealer trading (see Anderson and Dyl (2003)).
NASDAQ volume is adjusted to sixty percent of its original amount to facilitate matching across
exchanges.
34
I take every fifth firm as a matching firm, because of the size of the sample. This results in a control
sample of 100 firms.
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The values obtained from the matching process are presented in table 4.a. The average
price of the firms in the Standard and Poor 500 index is $49.15, and the average price of
the matching securities is $37.30. The mean daily standard deviation of the Standard and
Poor 500 index is .159%, and the average daily return standard deviation for the matched
sample is 2.05%. The average volume for the firms in the Standard and Poor 500 index
is 1,257,528 shares and the average volume of the matched sample was 1,525,896. The
average matching score of .3137 suggests that the firms included in the two samples are
similar along the matching criteria, but some of the individual matched sample’s
attributes are significantly different from those of the S and P 500 index. The matched
portfolio acts only as a benchmark for drawing conclusions regarding changes in spreads
of other securities in the market.

(Table 4.a here)

IVc. Changes In Liquidity:
Two spread estimates are employed in this analysis. The first measurement, the quoted
spread, is calculated as QSt = Askt − Bidt , where Askt is the ask price at time t and Bidt is
the bid price at time t. The effective spread has been suggested as a more accurate
measure35, because the quoted spread does not consider trades that take place inside the
best bid offer quote. The effective spread is calculated as ES = 2 pt − MPt , where pt is
the price at time t, and MPt is the quote midpoint at time t. These measures of the spread
35

See Stoll and Schenzler (2004).
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are used in the regression analysis described below. I also use dollar depth, which is the
sum of the depth at the bid and ask prices, and represents the number of shares multiplied
by the prevailing price.
The introduction of the sector SPDR funds is expected to influence the bid-ask spread
and depth in the underlying equities, because of informed traders preference to trade in
concentrated basket securities. To examine changes in liquidity, I employ a multivariate
analysis of spreads and depth, while controlling for price level, return volatility, and
trading volume changes. Because of possible negative correlation between the error
terms in the specifications36 of spreads and depth, I estimate a seemingly unrelated
regression 37of the following form:

LogSpreadRatio j = α S 0 + β S 1 LogVolumeRatio j + β S 2 LogPriceRatio j + β S 3 LogStdDevRatio j + ε Sj
LogDepthRatio j = α D 0 + β D1LogVolumeRatio j + β D 2 LogPriceRatio j + β D 3 LogStdDevRatio j + ε Dj
where E [ε Sj ε Dj ] ≠ 0

LogSpreadRatioj is calculated for each firm in two ways. First, it is the natural log of the
ratio of the average quoted spread in the post-period to the average quoted spread in the
pre-period. Second, it is calculated as the natural log of the average effective spread in
the post-period to the average effective spread in the pre-period. LogDepthRatioj is the
natural log of the ratio of the post-period dollar depth to the pre-period dollar depth. The
independent variables LogPriceRatioj, LogStdDevRatioj, and LogVolumeRatioj represent
the ratio of the average post to pre period price, return standard deviation, and daily
volume for firm j, respectively. The pre-period is defined as the thirty days preceding the
36
37

See Lee et al. (1993).
This model was employed in Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998)

95

Sector-SPDR introduction and the post-period is the thirty days following the SectorSPDR introduction. The model is constructed such that the intercepts capture the change
in the dependent variable around Sector-SPDR introduction for each firm j.

Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Stoll (1978) and Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998)) has
shown that depth tends to decrease with increases in price and volatility and tends to
increase with increases in trading volume, while spreads are negatively related to volume
and price and positively related to volatility38.

(Table 4.b and 4.c here)

The results of the liquidity analysis are shown in Table 4.c. After the introduction of the
Sector-SPDR ETFs, average quoted spreads increase 3%, and average effective spreads
increase 1.1%, and dollar depth decreases 6.39% while controlling for changes in
volume, price and standard deviation, The results from the control firm analysis indicate
that there was no significant change in dollar depth or quoted spreads while the effective
spreads experienced a significant decrease of .8% (t-value=1.78).

The decrease in depth and the increase in spreads suggest that uninformed traders
migrated to the basket securities, and because of this migration, market makers increased
the bid-ask spreads and decreases liquidity. This result further suggests that informed
traders did not migrate in numbers large enough to increase the liquidity of the

38

See also Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972), Bentson and Hagerman (1974), and Hamilton (1978)
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underlying shares.

This in turn suggests that the issuance of concentrated basket

securities does increase the liquidity of the underlying securities.

IVd. Adverse Selection:
I use a bid-ask spread adverse selection decomposition methodology to detect changes in
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.

Since informed traders are

predicted to migrate to the basket security, the adverse selection component of the bidask spread should decrease with the introduction of a concentrated basket security.

To estimate the level of adverse selection, I employ the method of Lin, Sanger and Booth
(1995), which decomposes the spread into adverse selection and order processing
components. This methodology estimates the proportion of the effective spread that can
be attributed to adverse selection. Similar to George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), Lin,
Sanger, and Booth (1995) assume that the specialist’s inventory holding costs are zero,
but they allow for a persistence parameter that captures the probability of trade reversal.
The intuition behind the model is that quotes are revised to reflect information contained
in the previous transaction.

The adverse selection and persistence parameters are estimated from the following
equations:

Qt +1 − Qt = λ Z t + ε t +1
Z t +1 = θ Z t + ηt +1
Z t = Pt − Qt
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where Qt is the quote midpoint at time t, Pt is the transaction price at time t, ε t +1 and ηt +1
are random error terms, and λ is the proportion of the effective spread that is attributed
to adverse selection. Clark and Shastri (2001) and Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001)
both find that the adverse selection estimates from the Lin, Sanger, and Booth model are
highly correlated with the adverse selection cost estimates produced from other market
microstructure spread decomposition models. Using these adverse selection cost
estimates, I estimate the following model:

LogAdverseRatioj=Β0 + Β1LogPriceRatioj + Β2LogVolumeRatioj + Β3LogStdDevRatioj + εj,

where LogAdverseRatioj is the natural log of the ratio of the average adverse selection
cost of the effective spread in the post-period to the average adverse selection cost of the
effective spread in the pre-period for each firm j. The independent variables
LogPriceRatioj, LogStdDevRatioj, and LogVolumeRatioj represent the ratio of the
average post to pre period price, return standard deviation, and daily volume for firm j,
respectively. The pre-period is defined as the thirty days preceding the Sector-SPDR
introduction, and the post-period is the thirty days following the Sector-SPDR
introduction.
(Table 4.d here)

The results of the adverse selection analysis are included in Table 4.d. The intercept
coefficient estimates indicate that adverse selection costs in the underlying securities
increase after the introduction of the Sector-SPDR ETFs. Adverse selection costs increase
by 2.17% after the introduction of the Sector-SPDR ETFs. There is no significant change
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in the adverse selection costs of the sample firms. Again, the adverse selection results
suggest that uninformed traders migrated to the basket securities.

In general these results support the traditional view that uninformed traders migrate from
trading in the underlying securities and trade in the security baskets. The concentrated
basket hypothesis, which conjectures that informed traders migrate to the Sector-SDPR
baskets because they are industry concentrated, is not supported in this framework. This
suggests that the introduction of a concentrated basket security does not result in a
significant migration of informed trading to this newly formed trading instrument. A
migration of this type would increase the liquidity of the underlying securities, because
the cost associated with informed trading would decrease and uninformed traders would
benefit.

These results also suggest that the constancy of the basket has little impact on the
reaction of informed agents. It is possible that informed agents shifted their trading to
options on the concentrated baskets. However, this conjecture is not tested in this work.
Furthermore, the results suggest that the introduction of basket securities reduces the
liquidity of the underlying securities.

Both issues warrant the attention of market

participants who trade the underlying securities of the newly formed basket securities.

V. Conclusion:
Do informed agents migrate to industry concentrated basket securities in sufficient
numbers to mitigate the movement of uniformed traders? I examine the effect of the
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introduction of the Sector-SPDR exchange traded funds on the underlying securities
liquidity and informed trading costs, and I find evident that informed agents do not
migrate to the concentrated basket securities in sufficient numbers to mitigate the effects
of uninformed trader migration.

Around the introduction of the Sector-SPDR exchange traded funds I find that quoted
spreads of the underlying securities increase by 3% while dollar depth decreases by 6%.
I also find that Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) estimates of the adverse selection component of
the bid ask spread increase 2.17% around the introduction Sector-SPDR exchange traded
funds.

The results of this investigation support the traditional view that uninformed traders
migrate from trading in the underlying securities and trade in the security baskets. The
concentrated basket hypothesis, which conjectures that informed traders migrate to the
Sector-SDPR baskets because they are industry concentrated, is not supported.
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Table 4.a
SPDR Matching Scores

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

S and P 500

49.15

42.71

24.20

5.44

293.90

Control

37.30

35.95

16.77

5.59

70.29

Std

S and P 500
Control

.00159
.02051

.00631
0.0015

.0013
0.0061

.000124
0.0087

.0291
0.068

Volume

S and P 500
Control

1,257,528
1,525,896

719,201
664,564

2,001,178
3,413,055

38,163
282,944

19,236,032
14,299,493

.3137

.1081

.2152

.000198

1.97

Price

Matching Score
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Table 4.b
S and P 500 Univariate Characteristics

S and P 500

Mean

LogQuotedRatioj
LogEffectiveRatioj
LogDepthRatioj
LogPriceRatioj,
LogStdDevRatioj,
LogVolumeRatioj

0.03
0.02
-0.01
0.01
0.10
0.16

Standard
Deviation
0.10
0.12
0.25
0.13
0.30
0.32

Min

Max

-0.54
-0.68
-0.69
-0.78
-1.31
-0.89

0.39
0.68
1.88
0.38
1.52
1.79
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Table 4.c
SPDR Spreads and Depth Measures

Panel A
Intercept
LogPriceRatio
LogStdDevRatio
LogVolumeRatio
System R2
Cross-Correlation (Error-term)
Panel B
Intercept
LogPriceRatio
LogStdDevRatio
LogVolumeRatio
System R2
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

S and P 500 Firms
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
.0301***
.011247*
(6.02)
(1.91)
.325***
.3487***
(9.66)
(8.82)
.047915***
.05866**
(2.98)
(3.11)
-0.024
.0167
(-1.56)
(.90)
.1823
.1668
-.26290
-.005
Control Firms
Quoted Spread
Effective Spread
.0124
-.0082*
(.912)
(1.781)
.428***
.5487***
(4.78)
(9.81)
.08121***
.0319**
(3.93)
(2.87)
-0.024*
.0201
(-1.89)
(.67)
.193
.159

Dollar Depth
-.06339***
(-5.23)
.3357***
(4.12)
-.04
(-1.04)
.3207***
(8.30)

Dollar Depth
.0191
(.1.10)
.453***
(5.61)
-.172
(-.731)
.7812***
(5.29)
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Table 4.d
SPDR Adverse Selection Model

Intercept
LogPriceRatio
LogStdDevRatio
LogVolumeRatio
Adj R2
F-Test
t-statistic in Parentheses
* indicates Significance 10% level
** indicates Significance 5% level
*** indicates significance 1% level

S and P 500 Firms
Averse Selection
.0217***
(2.78)
-.44***
(-2.60)
.0788
(.96)
-.12370
(-1.52)
.0094
2.55*

Control Firms
Averse Selection
-.0001
(1.12)
.0512
(.895)
.1034*
(1.66)
-.1512
(-.931)
.0153
1.13
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Part 5:

Limiting Factors and Future Research
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I. Limiting Factors:
Several factors limit the ability of researches to examine the microstructure
characteristics of the security markets in the United States. First, publicly available data
are limited. For example, all buys and sells in the order book are not available to the
public and are not disseminated on a historical basis. Thus, researchers are left to make
inferences about market liquidity from a small sub-set of the order book.

Second, market trades are not assigned an indicator for buys or sells. The researcher must
construct a method that extracts the most probable motivation behind the trade.
Furthermore, the researcher must determine if the transaction was a buy or a sell using an
algorithm which is known to not perfectly designate buys and sells properly. Again this
limits research in certain areas.

Third, the motivations behind any given trade are not know. For example, the researcher
does not know if a trade occurs because the trader is informed about the value of the
security or is just trading to obtain liquidity.

From a post trade perspective, it is very

difficult to distinguish trades that were made by informed agents versus those made by
uniformed agents. This further limits the ability of researches to examine the dynamics
behind the movements in stock prices and their ability to study the underlying liquidity of
the market.
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II. Future Research:
The results raise several more questions related to security market liquidity. In the first
essay I examine the liquidity impact of cross-listing of NASDAQ listed equities on the
Amex. In light of previous research my results suggest more study is needed on the
benefits and cost of Unlisted Trading Privilege security cross-listings. I find a slight
increase in liquidity after cross-listing, while previous research finds significant increases
in liquidity. More research is needed to explain the differences between the results of
previous works and the results of the first essay. The differences may be explained by
different market structures but more analysis is needed to determine if this is an
appropriate explanation.

In the second essay I examine adverse selection costs and liquidity of basket securities.
However, I examine these characteristics in equity only baskets. For example, I do not
include baskets securities that hold bonds. Of particular interest is how do informed
trading costs differ between bond ETFs and equity funds? Do informed traders prefer to
trade the equity baskets? What impact do these factors have on the underlying securities
liquidity?

The third essay examines the impact that the introduction of basket securities has on the
liquidity of the underlying securities. I find that the introduction of a concentrated basket
does not lead to an increase in the liquidity of the underlying securities. More study is
needed on the costs associated with the introduction of basket securities. Do the cost
increases, associated with reduced liquidity in the underlying, outweigh the utility gain
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associated with trading the security basket? If these costs do exceed the benefits, basket
security introduction leads to a net increase in trading costs!
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